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Abstract
How can di¤erent individualsprobability assignments to some events be
aggregated into a collective probability assignment? Classic results on this
problem assume that the set of relevant events the agenda is a -algebra
and is thus closed under disjunction (union) and conjunction (intersection).
We drop this demanding assumption and explore probabilistic opinion pool-
ing on general agendas. One might be interested in the probability of rain
and that of an interest-rate increase, but not in the probability of rain or an
interest-rate increase. We characterize linear pooling and neutral pooling
for general agendas, with classic results as special cases for agendas that
are -algebras. As an illustrative application, we also consider probabilistic
preference aggregation. Finally, we unify our results with existing results
on binary judgment aggregation and Arrovian preference aggregation. Our
unied theorems show why the same kinds of axioms (independence and
consensus preservation) have radically di¤erent implications for di¤erent
aggregation problems: linearity for probability aggregation and dictator-
ship for binary judgment or preference aggregation.
Keywords: Probabilistic opinion pooling, judgment aggregation, subjec-
tive probability, probabilistic preferences, vague/fuzzy preferences, agenda
characterizations, a unied perspective on aggregation
Although both authors are jointly responsible for this paper and project, Christian List
wishes to note that Franz Dietrich should be considered the lead author, to whom the credit
for the present mathematical proofs is due. This paper is the rst of two self-contained, but
technically related companion papers inspired by binary judgment-aggregation theory. Both
papers build on our earlier, unpublished paper Opinion pooling on general agendas(September
2007).
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1 Introduction
This paper addresses the problem of probabilistic opinion pooling. Suppose sev-
eral individuals submit probability assignments to some events. How can these
individual probability assignments be aggregated into a corresponding collective
probability assignment, while preserving probabilistic coherence? Although sta-
tisticians, economists, and philosophers have worked extensively on this problem,
almost all contributions have made the assumption that the set of events to which
probabilities are assigned the agenda is a -algebra: it is closed under negation
(complementation) and countable disjunction (union) of events. In practice, how-
ever, decision makers or expert panels may not be interested in such a rich set of
events. They may be interested, for example, in the probability of a blizzard and
the probability of an interest-rate increase, but not in the probability of a bliz-
zard or an interest-rate increase. Of course, the assumption that the agenda is a
-algebra is convenient: probability functions are dened on -algebras, and thus
one can view probabilistic opinion pooling as the aggregation of probability func-
tions. But convenience is no ultimate justication. Real-world expert committees
typically do not assign probabilities to all events in a given -algebra. Instead,
they focus on a limited set of relevant events, and this set does not contain all
disjunctions of its elements, let alone all disjunctions of countably innite length.
There are two reasons why a disjunction of relevant events, or another logical
combination, may not be relevant. Either we are simply not interested in the
probability of such articialcomposite events. Or we or the experts or decision-
makers in question are unable to assign subjective probabilities to them. To see
why it can be di¢ cult to assign a subjective probability to a logical combination
of basic events  such as a blizzard or an interest-rate increasenote that
it is not enough to assign probabilities to the underlying basic events: various
probabilistic dependencies also a¤ect the probability of the composite event, and
these dependencies may be the result of complex causal interconnections (such as
the causal e¤ects between basic events and their possible common causes).
We investigate probabilistic opinion pooling without assuming that the agenda
is a -algebra and consider instead general agendas: any set of events that is closed
under negation (complementation) can qualify as an agenda. This notion of an
agenda is imported from the theory of binary judgment aggregation (e.g., List
and Pettit 2002, 2004, Pauly and van Hees 2006, Dietrich 2006, Dietrich and List
2007a, 2013a, Nehring and Puppe 2010, Dietrich and Mongin 2010, Dokow and
Holzman 2010). We impose two axiomatic requirements on probabilistic opinion
pooling:
(i) the familiar independencerequirement, according to which the probability
that a group assigns to an event should depend solely on the probabilities
that the individuals assign to it;
(ii) the requirement that certain unanimous individual judgments should be
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preserved; we consider stronger and weaker variants of this requirement.
We prove two main results:
 For a large class of agendas with -algebras as special cases any opinion
pooling function satisfying (i) and (ii) is linear : the collective probability
of each event in the agenda is a weighted linear average of the individuals
probabilities of that event, where the weights are the same for all events.
 For an even larger class of agendas, any opinion pooling function satisfying
(i) and (ii) is neutral : the collective probability of each event in the agenda
is some (possibly non-linear) function of the individualsprobabilities of that
event, where the function is the same for all events.
We state three versions of each result, which di¤er in the nature of the unanimity-
preservation requirement and in the class of agendas to which they apply. Our
results generalize a classic characterization of linear pooling in the special case
where the agenda is -algebra (Aczél and Wagner 1980 and McConway 1981).1
For a -algebra, every neutral pooling function is automatically linear, so that
neutrality and linearity are equivalent here (McConway 1981 and Wagner 1982).2
As we will see, this peculiarity does not carry over to general agendas: many
agendas permit neutral but non-linear opinion pooling functions.
Some of our results apply even to agendas containing only logically indepen-
dent events, such as a blizzardand an interest-rate increase(and their nega-
tions), but no disjunctions or conjunctions of these events. Such agendas are
relevant in many practical applications, where the events in question are only
probabilistically dependent (correlated), but not logically dependent. If the agenda
is a -algebra, by contrast, it is replete with logical interconnections. By focusing
on -algebras alone, the standard results on probabilistic opinion pooling have
therefore excluded many realistic applications.
We also present a new illustrative application of probabilistic opinion pooling:
the case of probabilistic preference aggregation. Here each individual assigns sub-
1Specically, if the agenda is a -algebras (with more than four events), linear pooling func-
tions are the only pooling functions which satisfy independence and preserve unanimous proba-
bilistic judgments (Aczél and Wagner 1980 and McConway 1981). Linearity and neutrality (the
latter sometimes under the names strong label neutrality or strong setwise function property)
are among the most widely studied properties of opinion pooling functions. Linear pooling goes
back to Stone (1961) or even Laplace, and neutral pooling to McConway (1981) and Wagner
(1982). For other extensions of (or alternatives to) the classic characterization of linear pooling,
see also Wagner (1982/1985), Aczél, Ng, and Wagner (1984), Genest (1984), Mongin (1995),
and Chambers (2007). All of these works, however, retain the assumption that the agenda is
a -algebra. Genest and Zidek (1986) provide an excellent review of the classic literature. For
opinion pooling under asymmetric information, see Dietrich (2010). For the aggregation of qual-
itative rather than quantitative probabilities, see Weymark (1997). For a computational (and
non-axiomatic) approach to the aggregation of partial probability assignments, where individu-
als do not assign probabilities to all events in the underlying -algebra, see Osherson and Vardi
(2006).
2This assumes that the -algebra contains more than four events.
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jective probabilities to events of the form x is preferable than y(or x is better
than y), where x and y range over a given set of alternatives. These probability
assignments can be interpreted, for instance, as beliefs about which preferences
are the correctones (e.g., which correctly capture objective quality comparisons
between the alternatives). The group must then arrive at collective probability
assignments to the same events, which can be interpreted as the corresponding
collective beliefs. (Alternatively, the probability assignments can be interpreted
as vague or fuzzy preferences.)
Each of our linearity or neutrality results (with one exception) is logically
tight: the linearity or neutrality conclusion follows if and only if the agenda falls
into a relevant class. In other words, we fully characterize the agendas for which
our axiomatic requirements lead to linear or neutral aggregation. We thereby
adopt the state-of-the-art approach in binary judgment-aggregation theory, which
is to characterize the agendas leading to certain possibilities or impossibilities
of aggregation. This approach was introduced by Nehring and Puppe (2002) in
related work on strategy-proof social choice and subsequently applied throughout
binary judgment-aggregation theory. One of the present contributions is to show
how it can be applied in the area of probabilistic opinion pooling.
We conclude by comparing our results with their analogues in binary judgment-
aggregation theory and in Arrovian preference aggregation theory. Interestingly,
the conditions leading to linear pooling in probability aggregation correspond
exactly to the conditions leading to a dictatorship of one individual in both binary
judgment aggregation and Arrovian judgment aggregation. This suggests a new
unied perspective on several at rst sight disparate aggregation problems.
2 The framework
We consider a group of n  2 individuals, labelled i = 1; :::; n, who have to assign
collective probabilities to some events.
The agenda. Let 
 be a non-empty set of possible worlds (or states). An event
is a subset A of 
; its complement (negation) is denoted Ac := 
nA. The set
of events to which probabilities are to be assigned is called the agenda. Existing
works on probability aggregation have focused on agendas that are -algebras, i.e.,
sets of events that are closed under complementation and countable union (and by
implication also countable intersection). Here, we lift that restriction. As already
noted, we may exclude some events from the agenda, either because they are of no
interest, or because the individuals are unable to assign probabilities to them. For
example, the agenda may contain (i) the event that global warming will continue,
(ii) the event that the recession will continue, and (iii) the event that the UK will
remain in the European Union, but not the disjunction of all three events, which
4
may be too di¢ cult to assess. Formally, we dene an agenda as a non-empty
set X of events which is closed under complementation, i.e., A 2 X ) Ac 2 X.
Examples are X = fA;Acg or X = fA;Ac; B;Bcg, where the events A and B
may or may not be logically related. As should be clear, X may contain A and B
without containing A [B or A \B.
An example of an agenda containing no conjunctive or disjunctive
events. To give a simple example of an agenda that contains no conjunctions
or disjunctions, suppose each possible world is specied by a vector of three bi-
nary characteristics. The rst takes the value 1 if atmospheric CO2 is above some
critical threshold, and 0 otherwise. The second takes the value 1 if there is a
mechanism to the e¤ect that if atmospheric CO2 is above that threshold, then
Arctic summers are ice-free, and 0 otherwise. The third takes the value 1 if Arctic
summers are ice-free, and 0 otherwise. Thus the set of possible worlds is the set
of all triples of 0s and 1s, excluding the inconsistent triple in which the rst and
second characteristics are 1 and the third is 0, i.e., 
 = f0; 1g3nf(1; 1; 0)g. We can
now dene an agenda X consisting of A;A! B;B and their complements, where
A is the event of a positive rst characteristic, A ! B the event of a positive
second characteristic, and B the event of a positive third characteristic. (We use
the sentential notation A ! Bfor better readability; formally, each of A, B,
and A ! B are of course subsets of 
.3) Although there are non-trivial overlaps
and even logical connections between these events (in particular, A and A ! B
are inconsistent with Bc), the agenda contains no conjunctions or disjunctions.
An expert committee may well be faced with an opinion pooling problem on this
agenda.
Probabilistic opinions. Let us begin with the notion of a probability function.
The classical focus on agendas that are -algebras is motivated by the fact that
such functions are dened on -algebras. Formally, a probability function on a
-algebra  of events is a function P : ! [0; 1] such that P (
) = 1 and P is -
additive (i.e., P (A1[A2[ :::) = P (A1)+P (A2)+ ::: for every sequence of pairwise
disjoint events A1; A2; ::: 2 ). In the context of an arbitrary agenda X, we speak
of opinion functions rather than probability functions. Formally, an opinion
function for an agenda X is a function P : X ! [0; 1] which is probabilistically
coherent, i.e., extendable to a probability function on the -algebra generated
3Note that A! B (if A then B) is best interpreted as a non-material conditional, since its
negation, unlike that of a material conditional, is consistent with the negation of its antecedent,
A (i.e., Ac \ (A ! B)c 6= ?). (A material conditional is always true when its antecedent is
false.) The only assignment of truth-values to the events A;A! B, and B that is ruled out is
(1; 1; 0). If we wanted to re-interpret ! as a material conditional, we would have to rule out
in addition the truth-value assignments (0; 0; 0), (0; 0; 1) and (1; 0; 1), which would make little
sense in the present example. The event A! B would become Ac [ B (= (A \ Bc)c), and the
agenda would no longer be free from conjunctions or disjunctions. However, the agenda would
still not be a -algebra. For a discussion of non-material conditionals, see, e.g., Priest (2001).
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by X. This -algebra is denoted (X) and dened as the smallest -algebra
that includes X. It can be constructed by closing X under countable unions and
complements.4 In our expert-committee example, we have (X) = 2
, and an
opinion function cannot assign probability 1 to each of the events A, A ! B,
and Bc. This would be probabilistically incoherent since such an opinion function
would not be extendable to a well-dened probability function on 2
, given that
A \ (A ! B) \ Bc = ?. We write PX to denote the set of all opinion functions
for the agenda X. If X is a -algebra, PX is simply the set of all probability
functions on it.
Opinion pooling. Given the agenda X, a combination of opinion functions
across the n individuals, (P1; :::; Pn), is called a prole (of opinion functions). An
(opinion) pooling function is a function F : PnX ! PX , which assigns to each
prole (P1; :::; Pn) a collective opinion function P = F (P1; :::; Pn), also denoted
PP1;:::;Pn. For instance, PP1;:::;Pn could be the arithmetic average
1
n
P1 + ::: +
1
n
Pn.
Here, we focus on linear and neutral pooling functions, as dened in the next
paragraph.
Linearity and neutrality. We call a pooling function linear if there exist real-
valued weights w1; :::; wn  0 with w1 + ::: + wn = 1 such that, for every prole
(P1; :::; Pn) 2 PnX ,
PP1;:::;Pn(A) =
nX
i=1
wiPi(A) for all A 2 X.
If wi = 1 for some expert i, we obtain an expert rule given by PP1;:::;Pn = Pi.
More generally, we call a pooling function neutral if there exists some function
D : [0; 1]n ! [0; 1] such that, for every prole (P1; :::; Pn) 2 PnX ,
PP1;:::;Pn(A) = D(P1(A); :::; Pn(A)) for all A 2 X: (1)
We call D the local pooling criterion. Since it does not depend on the event A,
all events are treated equally (which explains the term neutral). Linearity is
the special case in which D is a weighted linear averaging criterion of the form
D(x) =
Xn
i=1
wixi for all x 2 [0; 1]n. Note that, while every combination of
weights w1; :::; wn  0 with sum-total 1 denes a proper linear pooling function
(since any linear average of opinion functions is an opinion function), it is far
from clear whether a given non-linear function D : [0; 1]n ! [0; 1] denes a proper
pooling function. In particular, formula (1) might not yield a well-dened opinion
function, which has to be coherent. We will see that whether there can be neutral
4So, whenever X contains A and B, then (X) contains A [ B, (A [ B)c, (A [ B)c [ B,
and so on. Sometimes (X) is simply the set 2
 of all events; this happens when all events are
constructible from events in X.
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but non-linear pooling functions depends on the agenda in question. If the agenda
is a -algebra, it is well known that the answer is negative (assuming jXj > 4).
However, we will also identify many agendas for which the answer is positive.
Some logical terminology. Finally, it is useful to introduce some logical termi-
nology. We call an event A contingent if it is neither the empty set ? (impossible)
nor the universal set 
 (necessary). We call a set S of events consistent if its in-
tersection \A2SA is non-empty, and inconsistent otherwise. We say that a set S
of events entails another event B if the intersection of S is included in B (i.e.,
\A2SA  B).
3 Two kinds of applications
We can distinguish between two kinds of applications of probabilistic opinion
pooling. We may be interested in either of the following:
(a) the probabilities of certain propositions expressed in natural language, such
as it will rain tomorrow or the new legislation will be rejected by the
constitutional court;
(b) the distribution of some real-valued (or vector-valued) random variable, such
as the number of insurance claims over a given period, or tomorrows price
of a given share, or the weight of a randomly picked potato from a particular
farm.
Arguably, the study of probabilistic opinion pooling on general agendas is more
relevant to applications of type (a) than to applications of type (b). An application
of type (a) typically gives rise to an agenda expressible in natural language which
does not constitute a full -algebra. Here it would usually be implausible to
replace the agenda X with the -algebra (X), because many events in (X)
represent complex combinations of events, which we are neither interested in nor
able to assess. Furthermore, even when (X) is nite, it is often enormous: if
X contains at least k logically independent events, then (X) contains at least
22
k
events, and so its size grows double-exponentially in k.5 This suggests that,
unless k is small, (X) is often far too large to be used as an agenda in practice.
By contrast, an application of type (b) plausibly gives rise to an agenda that
is a -algebra, not only because the decision-makers may need a full probability
distribution over the -algebra, but also because they may be able to specify such
a distribution. For instance, a market analyst who has been asked to estimate next
months distribution of Apples share price might decide to submit a log-normal
distribution. This, in turn, requires the specication of only two parameters:
5For instance, if X contains k = 2 logically independent events, say A and B, then X includes
a partition A of 
 into 2k = 4 non-empty events, namely A = fA\B;A\Bc; Ac \B;Ac \Bcg,
and hence X includes the set f[C2CC : C  Ag containing 22k = 16 events.
7
the mean and the variance of the exponential of the share price. Opinion pooling
problems of type (b) are discussed in more detail in a companion paper (Dietrich
and List 2013b), where they are one of our principal applications.
4 Axiomatic requirements on opinion pooling
We now introduce some requirements on opinion pooling functions for a general
agenda X.
4.1 The independence requirement
Our rst requirement, independence, says that the collective probability of each
event in the agenda should depend only on the individual probabilities of that
event. This requirement is familiar from the literature and sometimes also called
the weak setwise function property.
Independence. For each event A 2 X, there exists a function DA : [0; 1]n !
[0; 1] (the local pooling criterion for A) such that, for all P1; :::; Pn 2 PX ,
PP1;:::;Pn(A) = DA(P1(A); :::; Pn(A)):
The main justication for independence is the democratic idea that the col-
lective view on any issue should depend only on individual views on that issue.
This reects a local, as opposed to holistic, understanding of democracy. (Under
a holistic understanding, the collective view on an issue may also be inuenced
by individual views on other issues.) Independence, understood as a democratic
requirement, becomes less compelling if the agenda contains articial events,
such as conjunctions of intuitively unrelated events, as in the case of a -algebra.
It would seem implausible, for instance, to disregard the individual probabilities
assigned to a blizzardand to an interest-rate increasewhen determining the col-
lective probability of the disjunctive event a blizzard or an interest-rate increase.
Here, however, we focus on general agendas, where the democratic justication
for independence is more plausible.
There are also two pragmatic justications for independence; these apply even
when the agenda is a -algebra. First, determining the collective view on any issue
based on individual views on that issue is informationally and computationally
less demanding than a holistic approach and thus easier to implement in practice.
Second, independence prevents certain types of agenda manipulation  the at-
tempt by an agenda setter to inuence the collective probability assigned to some
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events by adding other events to, or removing them from, the agenda.6 Nonethe-
less, independence should not be accepted uncritically, since it is vulnerable to a
number of well-known objections.7
4.2 The consensus-preservation requirement
Our next requirement says that whenever all individuals assign probability 1 
certaintyto an event in the agenda, then its collective probability should also
be 1.
Consensus preservation. For all A 2 X and all P1; :::; Pn 2 PX , if, for all i,
Pi(A) = 1, then PP1;:::;Pn(A) = 1.
Like independence, this requirement is familiar from the standard literature,
where it is sometimes expressed as a zero-probability preservation requirement. In
the case of general agendas, however, we can also formulate several strengthened
variants of the requirement, which extend it to other forms of consensus. Although
these strengthened variants are not as compelling as the original requirement,
they are still defensible in some cases. Their close relationship with the original
requirement is illustrated by the fact that when the agenda is a -algebra, they
all collapse back into consensus preservation in its original form.
To introduce the di¤erent extensions of consensus preservation, we begin by
drawing a distinction between explicitly revealed, implicitly revealed, and un-
revealedbeliefs:
 Individual is explicitly revealed beliefs are the probabilities assigned to
events in the agenda X by the opinion function Pi.
 Individual is implicitly revealed beliefs are the probabilities assigned to any
events in (X)nX by every probability function on (X) extending the opin-
ion function Pi; we call such a probability function an extension of Pi and
use the notation P i. These probabilities are impliedby the opinion func-
tion Pi. For instance, if Pi assigns probability 1 to an event A in the agenda
X, this impliesan assignment of probability 1 to all events B outside the
agenda that are of the form B  A.
6In the classical case in which X is a -algebra, McConway (1981) shows that independence
(his weak setwise function property) is equivalent to the marginalization property, which requires
aggregation to commute with the operation of reducing the -algebra to some sub--algebra
  X. A similar result holds for general agendas X.
7In particular, when the agenda is a -algebra, independence is known to conict with
the preservation of unanimously held judgments of probabilistic independence, assuming non-
dictatorial aggregation (see Genest and Wagner 1984; Bradley, Dietrich, and List forthcoming).
Whether this objection also applies in the case of general agendas depends on the precise nature
of the agenda. Another objection is that independence is not generally compatible with external
Bayesianity, the requirement that aggregation commute with Bayesian updating of probabilities
in light of new information.
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 Individual is unrevealed beliefs are any probabilities for events in (X)nX
that cannot be deduced from the opinion function Pi. These are only pri-
vately held. For instance, the opinion function Pi may admit extensions
to (X) which assign probability 1 to an event B but may also admit ex-
tensions which assign probability less than 1. In this case, individual is
belief about B is unrevealed. From the perspective of a pooling function
into which opinion functions like Pi are fed as input, such unrevealed beliefs
are unobserved.
Consensus preservation in its original form concerns only explicitly revealed
beliefs. The rst strengthened variant extends the requirement to implicitly re-
vealed beliefs. Let us say that an opinion function P on X implies certainty of
an event A if, for every extension P of P , we have P (A) = 1.
Implicit consensus preservation. For all A 2 (X) and all P1; :::; Pn 2 PX ,
if, for all i, Pi implies certainty of A, then PP1;:::;Pn also implies certainty of A.
This ensures that whenever all individuals either explicitly or implicitly assign
probability 1 to some event, this is preserved at the collective level. Arguably, this
requirement is almost as plausible as consensus preservation in its original form.
The second extension concerns unrevealed beliefs. Informally, it says that a
unanimous assignment of probability 1 to some event should never be overruled,
even if it is unrevealed. This is operationalized as the requirement that if every
individuals opinion function is consistent with the assignment of probability 1
to some event (so that we cannot rule out the possibility of the individualspri-
vately making that assignment), then the collective opinion function should also
be consistent with it. Formally, we say that an opinion function P on X is con-
sistent with certainty of an event A if there exists some extension P of P such
that P (A) = 1.
Consensus compatibility. For all A 2 (X) and all P1; :::; Pn 2 PX , if, for all i,
Pi is consistent with certainty of A, then PP1;:::;Pn is also consistent with certainty
of A.
The rationale for this requirement is a precautionary one: if it is possible
that all individuals assign probability 1 to some event (even though this may be
unrevealed), the collective opinion function should not rule out certainty of A.
A third extension of consensus preservation concerns conditional beliefs. It
is more complicated to state than consensus compatibility, but less demanding.
Its initial motivation is the idea that if all individuals are certain of some event
in the agenda conditional on another event, then this conditional belief should
be preserved collectively. For instance, if everyone is certain that there will be a
famine, given a civil war, this belief should also be held collectively. Unfortunately,
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however, we cannot dene individual is conditional probability of an event A,
given another event B, simply as Pi(AjB) = Pi(A \ B)=Pi(B) (where Pi(B) 6= 0
and Pi is individual is opinion function). This is because, even when A and B
are in X, the event A \ B may be outside X and thus outside the domain of Pi.
So, we cannot know whether the individual is certain of A given B. But we can
ask whether he or she could be certain of A given B, i.e., whether P i(AjB) = 1
for some extension P of P .
This motivates the requirement that if each individual could be certain of A
given B, then the collective opinion function should also be consistent with this
conditional certainty. Again, this can be interpreted as requiring the preservation
of certain unrevealed beliefs. A unanimous assignment of conditional probability
1 to one event, given another, should not be overruled, even if it is unrevealed.
We capture this in the following way. Suppose there is a nite set of pairs
of events in X call them (A;B), (A0; B0), (A00; B00), and so on such that each
individual could be simultaneously certain of A given B, of A0 given B0, of A00
given B00, and so on. Then the collective opinion function should also be consistent
with conditional certainty of A given B, A0 given B0, and so on. Formally, for any
nite set S of pairs (A;B) of events in X, we say that an opinion function P on
X is consistent with conditional certainty of all (A;B) in S if there exists some
extension P of P such that P (AjB) = 1 for all (A;B) in S for which P (B) 6= 0.
Conditional consensus compatibility. For all nite sets S of pairs of events in
X and all P1; :::; Pn 2 PX , if, for all i, Pi is consistent with conditional certainty
of all (A;B) in S, then PP1;:::;Pn is also consistent with conditional certainty of all
(A;B) in S.
The following proposition summarizes the logical relationships between the
di¤erent consensus-preservation requirements; a proof is given in Appendix A8.
Proposition 1 (a) Consensus preservation is implied by each of (i) implicit con-
sensus preservation, (ii) consensus compatibility, and (iii) conditional con-
sensus compatibility, and is equivalent to each of (i), (ii), and (iii) if the
agenda X is a -algebra.
(b) Consensus compatibility implies conditional consensus compatibility.
Each of our characterization results below uses consensus preservation in either
its original form or one of the strengthened forms. Implicit consensus preservation
does not appear in any of our results; we have included it here for the sake of
conceptual completeness.8
8An interesting fourth variant is the requirement obtained by combining the antecedent of
implicit consensus preservation with the conclusion of consensus compatibility. This condition
weakens both implicit consensus preservation and consensus compatibility, while still strength-
ening the initial consensus preservation requirement.
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5 When is opinion pooling neutral?
We now show that, for many agendas, the neutral pooling functions are the only
pooling functions satisfying independence and consensus preservation in either
its original form or one of the strengthened forms. The stronger the consensus-
preservation requirement invoked, the larger the class of agendas for which our
characterization of neutral pooling holds. For the moment, we set aside the ques-
tion of whether independence and consensus preservation imply linearity as well
as neutrality; we address this question in the next section.
5.1 Three theorems
We begin with the strongest of our consensus-preservation requirements, i.e., con-
sensus compatibility. If we impose this requirement, our characterization of neu-
tral pooling holds for a very large class of agendas: all non-nested agendas. We
call an agenda X nested if it has the form X = fA;Ac : A 2 X+g for some
set X+ ( X) that is linearly ordered by set-inclusion, and non-nested other-
wise. For example, binary agendas of the form X = fA;Acg are nested: take
X+ := fAg, which is trivially linearly ordered by set-inclusion. Also, the agenda
X = f( 1; t]; (t;1) : t 2 Rg (where the set of possible worlds is 
 = R) is
nested: take X+ := f( 1; t] : t 2 Rg, which is linearly ordered by set-inclusion.
By contrast, any agenda consisting of multiple logically independent pairs
A;Ac is non-nested, i.e., X is non-nested if X = fAk; Ack : k 2 Kg with jKj  2
such that every subset S  X containing precisely one member of each pair
fAk; Ackg (with k 2 K) is consistent. As mentioned in the introduction, such
agendas are of great practical importance because many decision problems involve
events that exhibit only probabilistic dependencies (correlations), but no logical
ones. Another example of a non-nested agenda is the one in the expert-committee
example above, containing A, A! B, B, and their complements.
Theorem 1 (a) For any non-nested agenda X, every pooling function F : PnX !
PX satisfying independence and consensus compatibility is neutral.
(b) For any nested agenda X ( 6= f?;
g), there exists a non-neutral pooling
function F : PnX ! PX satisfying independence and consensus compatibility.
Part (b) shows that the agenda condition used in part (a) non-nestedness
is tight: whenever the agenda is nested, non-neutral pooling functions become
possible. However, these pooling functions are non-neutral only in a limited sense:
although the pooling criterion DA need not be the same for all events A 2 X,
it must still be the same for all A 2 X+, and the same for all A 2 XnX+ (with
X+ as dened above), so that pooling is neutral within X+and neutral within
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XnX+. This is clear from the proof.9
What happens if we weaken the requirement of consensus compatibility to
conditional consensus compatibility? Both parts of Theorem 1 continue to hold,
though part (a) becomes a logically stronger claim, and part (b) a logically weaker
claim. Let us state the modied theorem explicitly:
Theorem 2 (a) For any non-nested agenda X, every pooling function F : PnX !
PX satisfying independence and conditional consensus compatibility is neu-
tral.
(b) For any nested agenda X ( 6= f?;
g), there exists a non-neutral pooling
function F : PnX ! PX satisfying independence and conditional consensus
compatibility.
The situation changes once we weaken the consensus requirement further,
namely to consensus preservation simpliciter. The class of agendas for which
our characterization of neutrality holds shrinks signicantly, namely to the class
of path-connected agendas. Path-connectedness is an important condition in
judgment-aggregation theory, where it was introduced by Nehring and Puppe
(2010) (under the name total blockedness) and has been used, for example, to
generalize Arrows theorem (Dietrich and List 2007a, Dokow and Holzman 2010).
To dene path-connectedness, we require one preliminary denition. Given
an agenda X, we say that an event A 2 X conditionally entails another event
B 2 X, written A ` B, if there exists a subset Y  X (possibly empty, but
not uncountably innite) such that fAg [ Y entails B, where, for non-triviality,
Y [fAg and Y [fBcg are each consistent. For instance, if ? 6= A  B 6= 
, then
A ` B (take Y = ?; in fact, this is even an unconditional entailment). Also, for
the agenda of our expert committee, X = fA;Ac; A ! B; (A ! B)c; B;Bcg, we
have A ` B (take Y = fA! Bg).
We call an agenda X path-connected if any two events A;B 2 Xnf?;
g
can be connected by a path of conditional entailments, i.e., there exist events
A1; :::; Ak 2 X (k  1) such that A = A1 ` A2 ` ::: ` Ak = B. An example of
a path-connected agenda is X := fA;Ac : A  R is a bounded intervalg, where
the underlying set of worlds is 
 = R. For instance, there is a path of conditional
entailments from [0; 1] 2 X to [2; 3] 2 X given by [0; 1] ` [0; 3] ` [2; 3]. To
establish [0; 1] ` [0; 3], it su¢ ces to conditionalize on the empty set of events
Y = ? (i.e., [0; 1] even unconditionally entails [0; 3]). To establish [0; 3] ` [2; 3],
one may conditionalize on Y = f[2; 4]g.
Many agendas are not path-connected, including the agenda of our expert
committee and all nested agendas X (6= f?;
g). The following theorem holds.
9As a consequence, full neutrality follows even for nested agendas if independence is slightly
strengthened by requiring that DA = DAc for some A 2 Xnf?;
g.
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Theorem 3 (a) For any path-connected agenda X, every pooling function F :
PnX ! PX satisfying independence and consensus preservation is neutral.
(b) For any non-path-connected agenda X (nite and distinct from f?;
g),
there exists a non-neutral pooling function F : PnX ! PX satisfying inde-
pendence and consensus preservation.
5.2 Sketch proofs
We now outline the proofs of Theorems 1 to 3. (Details are given in the Appendix.)
We begin with part (a) of each theorem. Theorem 1(a) follows from Theorem 2(a),
since both results apply to the same agendas but Theorem 1(a) uses a stronger
consensus requirement.
To prove Theorem 2(a), we dene a binary relation  on the set of all contin-
gent events in the agenda. First recall that two events A and B are exclusive if
A \B = ? and exhaustive if A [B = 
. Now, for any events A;B 2 Xnf?;
g,
we dene
A  B , there is a nite sequence A1; :::; Ak 2 X with A1 = A and Ak = B
such that any adjacentAj; Aj+1 are neither exclusive nor exhaustive.
Theorem 2(a) then follows immediately from the following two lemmas (proved
in the Appendix).
Lemma 1 For any agenda X (6= f?;
g), the relation  is an equivalence rela-
tion on Xnf?;
g, with exactly two equivalence classes if X is nested, and exactly
one if X is non-nested.
Lemma 2 For any agenda X (6= f?;
g), a pooling function satisfying indepen-
dence and conditional consensus compatibility is neutral on each equivalence class
with respect to  (i.e., the local pooling criterion is the same for all events in the
same equivalence class).
The proof of Theorem 3(a) uses the following lemma (broadly analogous to a
lemma in binary judgment-aggregation theory; e.g., Nehring and Puppe 2010 and
Dietrich and List 2007a).
Lemma 3 For any pooling function satisfying independence and consensus preser-
vation, and all events A and B in the agenda X, if A ` B then DA  DB (where
DA and DB are the local pooling criteria for A and B, respectively).
To see why Theorem 3(a) follows, simply note thatDA  DB whenever there is
a path of conditional entailments from A 2 X to B 2 X (by repeated application
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of the lemma); thus, DA = DB whenever there are paths in both directions, as is
guaranteed if the agenda is path-connected and A;B 62 f?;
g.
Part (b) of each theorem can be proved by explicitly constructing a non-
neutral pooling function  for an agenda of the relevant kind which satises
independence and the appropriate consensus-preservation requirement. In the
case of Theorem 3(b), this pooling function is very complex, and hence we omit
it in the main text. In the case of Theorems 1(a) and 1(b), the idea can be
described informally. Recall that a nested agenda X can be partitioned into two
subsets, X+ and XnX+ = fAc : A 2 X+g, each of which is linearly ordered by
set-inclusion. The opinion pooling function constructed has the property that (i)
all events A in X+ have the same local pooling criterion D = DA, which can be
dened, for example, as the square of some linear pooling criterion, and (ii) all
events in XnX+ have the same complementarypooling criterion D, dened as
D(x1; :::; xn) = 1   D(1   x1; :::; 1   xn) for all (x1; :::; xn) 2 [0; 1]n. Showing
that the resulting pooling function is well-dened and satises all the relevant
requirements involves some technicality, in part because we allow the agenda to
have any cardinality.
6 When is opinion pooling linear?
As we have just seen, for many agendas, only neutral pooling functions can satisfy
our two requirements. But are these pooling functions also linear? As we now
show, the answer depends on the agenda in question. If we suitably restrict the
class of agendas considered in part (a) of each of our previous theorems, we can
derive linearity rather than just neutrality. Similarly, we can expand the class of
agendas considered in part (b) of each theorem, and replace non-neutrality with
non-linearity.
6.1 Three theorems
As in the previous section, we begin with the strongest consensus-preservation
requirement, i.e., consensus compatibility. While this requirement leads to neu-
trality for all non-nested agendas (by Theorem 1), it leads to linearity for all
non-nested agendas above a certain size.
Theorem 4 (a) For any non-nested agenda X with jXnf
;?gj > 4, every pool-
ing function F : PnX ! PX satisfying independence and consensus compati-
bility is linear.
(b) For any other agenda X ( 6= f?;
g), there exists a non-linear pooling func-
tion F : PnX ! PX satisfying independence and consensus compatibility.
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Next, let us weaken the requirement of consensus compatibility to conditional
consensus compatibility. While this requirement leads to neutrality for all non-
nested agendas (by Theorem 2), it leads to linearity only for non-simple agendas.
Like path-connected agendas, non-simple agendas play an important role in binary
judgment-aggregation theory, where they are the agendas susceptible to the ana-
logues of Condorcets paradox: the possibility of inconsistent majority judgments
(e.g., Dietrich and List 2007b, Nehring and Puppe 2007).
To dene non-simplicity, we rst require a preliminary denition. We call a set
of events Y minimal inconsistent if it is inconsistent but every proper subset Y 0 (
Y is consistent. Examples of minimal inconsistent sets are (i) fA;B; (A \ B)cg,
where A and B are logically independent events, and (ii) fA;A! B;Bcg, with A,
B, and A ! B as dened in the expert-committee example above. In each case,
the three events are mutually inconsistent, but any two of them are mutually con-
sistent. The notion of a minimal inconsistent set is useful for characterizing logical
dependencies between the events in the agenda. Trivial examples of minimal in-
consistent subsets of the agenda are those of the form fA;Acg  X, where A is
contingent. But many interesting agendas have more complex minimal inconsis-
tent subsets. One may regard supYX:Y is minimal inconsistent jY j as a measure of the
complexity of the logical dependencies in the agenda X. Given this idea, we call
an agenda X non-simple if it has at least one minimal inconsistent subset Y  X
containing more than two (but not uncountably many10) events, and simple other-
wise. For instance, the agenda consisting of A, A! B, B and their complements
in our expert-committee example is non-simple (take Y = fA;A! B;Bcg).
Non-simplicity lies logically between non-nestedness and path-connectedness:
it implies non-nestedness, and is implied by path-connectedness (ifX 6= f
;?g).11
In particular, to see how exactly non-simplicity strengthens non-nestedness, note
the following fact (due to Dietrich 2013 in binary judgment-aggregation theory
10This countability addition can often be dropped because all minimal inconsistent sets Y  X
are automatically nite or at least countable. This is so if X is nite or countably innite, and
also if the underlying set of worlds 
 is countable. It can further be dropped in the (frequent) case
that the events in X represent sentences in a language: then, provided this language belongs to
a compact logic, all minimal inconsistent sets Y  X are nite (because any inconsistent set has
a nite inconsistent subset). By contrast, if X is a -algebra and has innite cardinality, then
it usually contains events not representing sentences, because countably innite disjunctions
cannot be formed in a language. Such agendas often have uncountable minimal inconsistent
subsets. For instance, if X is the -algebra of Borel-measurable subsets of R, then its subset
Y = fRnfxg : x 2 Rg is uncountable and minimal inconsistent. This agenda is nonetheless
non-simple, since it also has many nite minimal inconsistent subsets Y with jY j  3 (e.g.,
Y = ff1; 2g; f1; 3g; f2; 3gg).
11To give an example of a non-nested but simple agenda X, let X = fA;Ac; B;Bcg, where the
events A and B are logically independent, i.e., A\B;A\Bc; Ac \B;Ac \Bc 6= ?. Clearly, this
agenda is non-nested. It is simple since its only minimal inconsistent subsets are fA;Acg and
fB;Bcg. To give an example of a non-path-connected, but non-simple agenda, let X consist of
A;A! B;B and their complements, as in our example above. We have already observed that
it is non-simple. To see that it is not path-connected, note, for example, that there is no path
of conditional entailments from B to BC .
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and proved here again in the present framework, for completeness):
Fact (a) An agenda X (with jXnf
;?gj > 4) is non-nested if and only if it has
at least one subset Y with jY j  3 such that (Y nfAg) [ fAcg is consistent
for each A 2 Y .
(b) An agenda X (with jXnf
;?gj > 4) is non-simple if and only if it has at
least one inconsistent subset Y (of countable size) with jY j  3 such that
(Y nfAg) [ fAcg is consistent for each A 2 Y .
Note that the characterizing condition in (b) can be obtained from the one in
(a) simply by replacing subset Y with inconsistent subset Y (of countable size).
Theorem 5 (a) For any non-simple agenda X with jXnf
;?gj > 4, every pool-
ing function F : PnX ! PX satisfying independence and conditional consen-
sus compatibility is linear.
(b) For any simple agenda X (nite and distinct from f?;
g), there exists
a non-linear pooling function F : PnX ! PX satisfying independence and
conditional consensus compatibility.
Finally, we turn to the least demanding consensus requirement, namely consen-
sus preservation simpliciter. We have seen that this requirement leads to neutral
pooling if the agenda is path-connected (by Theorem 3). To obtain a characteri-
zation of linear pooling, path-connectedness alone is not enough. In the following
theorem, we impose an additional condition on the agenda. We call an agenda X
partitional if it has a subset Y which partitions 
 into at least three non-empty
events (where Y is nite or countably innite), and non-partitional otherwise.
For instance, X is partitional if it contains (non-empty) events A, Ac \ B, and
Ac \Bc; simply let Y = fA;Ac \B;Ac \Bcg.
Theorem 6 (a) For any path-connected and partitional agenda X, every pooling
function F : PnX ! PX satisfying independence and consensus preservation
is linear.
(b) For any non-path-connected (nite) agenda X, there exists a non-linear pool-
ing function F : PnX ! PX satisfying independence and consensus preserva-
tion.
Part (b) shows that one of theorems agenda conditions, path-connectedness,
is necessary for the characterization of linear pooling (which is unsurprising, as
it is already necessary for the characterization of neutral pooling). By contrast,
the other agenda condition, partitionality, is not necessary: linearity also follows
from independence and consensus preservation for some non-partitional but path-
connected agendas. So, the agenda conditions of part (a) are non-minimal. We
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leave the task of nding minimal agenda conditions as a challenge for future
research.12
Despite its non-minimality, the partionality condition in Theorem 6 is not
redundant: if it were dropped (and not replaced with another appropriate condi-
tion), part (a) would cease to hold. This follows from the following (non-trivial)
proposition:
Proposition 2 For some path-connected and non-partitional (nite) agenda X,
there exists a non-linear pooling function F : PnX ! PX satisfying independence
and consensus preservation.13
Readers familiar with binary judgment-aggregation theory will notice that the
agenda which we construct to prove this proposition violates an important agenda
condition from that area, namely even-number negatability (or
non-a¢ neness) (see Dietrich 2007, Dietrich and List 2007, Dokow and Holzman
2010). It would be intriguing if the same condition turned out to be the correct
minimal substitute for partionality in Theorem 6.
6.2 Sketch proofs
We now describe how Theorems 4 to 6 can be proved. (Again, details are given
in the Appendix.) We begin with part (a) of each theorem. To prove Theorem
4(a), consider a non-nested agendaX with jXnf
;?gj > 4 and a pooling function
F satisfying independence and consensus compatibility. We want to show that
F is linear. Neutrality already follows from Theorem 1(a). From neutrality, we
can infer linearity by using two lemmas. The rst contains the bulk of the work,
and the second is an application of Cauchys functional equation (similar to its
application in Aczél and Wagner 1980 and McConway 1981). Let us write 0 and
1 to denote the n-tuples (0; :::; 0) and (1; :::; 1), respectively.
Lemma 4 If D : [0; 1]n ! [0; 1] is the local pooling criterion of a neutral and
consensus-compatible pooling function for a non-nested agenda X with
jXnf
;?gj > 4, then
D(x) +D(y) +D(z) = 1 for all x; y; z 2 [0; 1]n with x+ y + z = 1. (2)
12A generalized denition of partitionality is possible in Theorem 6: we could dene an agenda
X to be partitional if there are nite or countably innite subsets Y; Z  X such that the set
fA \ C : A 2 Y g, with C = \B2ZB, partitions C into at least three non-empty events. This
denition generalizes the one in the main text, because if we take Z = ?, then C becomes 

(= \B2?B) and Y simply partitions 
. But since we do not know whether this generalized
denition renders partitionality logically minimal in Theorem 6, we use the simpler denition
in the main text.
13This assumes that the underlying set of worlds 
 satises j
j  4.
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Lemma 5 If a function D : [0; 1n] ! [0; 1] with D(0) = 0 satises (2), then it
takes the linear form
D(x1; :::; xn) =
nX
i=1
wixi for all x 2 [0; 1]n
for some non-negative weights w1; :::; wn with sum 1.
The proof of Theorem 5(a) follows a similar strategy, but replaces Lemma 4
with the following lemma:
Lemma 6 If D : [0; 1]n ! [0; 1] is the local pooling criterion of a neutral and
conditional-consensus-compatible pooling function for a non-simple agenda X,
then (2) holds.
Finally, Theorem 6(a) can also be proved using a similar strategy, this time
replacing Lemma 4 with the following lemma:
Lemma 7 If D : [0; 1]n ! [0; 1] is the local pooling criterion of a neutral and
consensus-preserving pooling function for a partitional agenda X, then (2) holds.
Part (b) of each of Theorems 4 to 6 can be proved by constructing a suitable
example of a non-linear pooling function. In the case of Theorem 4(b), we can
re-use the non-neutral pooling function constructed to prove Theorem 1(b) as long
as the agenda satises jXnf
;?gj > 4; for (small) agendas with jXnf
;?gj  4,
we construct a somewhat simplistic pooling function generating collective opin-
ion functions that only assign probabilities of 0, 1
2
, or 1. The constructions for
Theorems 5(b) and 6(b) are more di¢ cult; the one for Theorem 5(b) also has the
property that collective probabilities never take values other than 0, 1
2
, or 1.
7 Classic results on opinion pooling as special
cases
It is instructive to see how our present results generalize classic results in the
literature, where the agenda is a -algebra (especially Aczél and Wagner 1980
and McConway 1981). The rst thing to note is that, for a -algebra, all the
agenda conditions we have used reduce to a simple condition on agenda size. It
is easy to see that the following result holds:
Lemma 8 For any agenda X (6= f
;?g) that is closed under pairwise union or
intersection (i.e., any agenda that is an algebra), the conditions of non-nestedness,
non-simplicity, path-connectedness, and partitionality are equivalent, and are each
satised if and only if jXj > 4.
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Note, further, that when X is a -algebra, all of our consensus requirements
become equivalent, as shown by Proposition 1(a). It follows that, in the special
case of a -algebra, our six theorems reduce to two classical results:
 Theorems 1 to 3 reduce to the result that all pooling functions satisfying
independence and consensus preservation are neutral if jXj > 4, but not if
jXj = 4;
 Theorems 4 to 6 reduce to the result that all pooling functions satisfying
independence and consensus preservation are linear if jXj > 4, but not if
jXj = 4.
The case jXj < 4 is uninteresting because it implies that X = f?;
g, given
that X is a -algebra. In fact, we can derive these classic theorems not only for
-algebras, but also for algebras. This is because, given Lemma 8, Theorems 3
and 6 have the following implication:
Corollary 1 For any agenda X that is closed under pairwise union or intersec-
tion (i.e., any agenda that is an algebra),
(a) if jXj > 4, every pooling function F : PnX ! PX satisfying independence
and consensus preservation is linear (and by implication neutral);
(b) if jXj = 4, there exists a non-neutral (and by implication non-linear) pooling
function F : PnX ! PX satisfying independence and consensus preservation.
8 An illustrative application: probabilistic
preference aggregation
To illustrate the use of general agendas, we now apply our results to a rather dif-
ferent context, namely that of probabilistic preference aggregation, a probabilistic
analogue of Arrovian preference aggregation. A group seeks to rank a set K of at
least two (mutually exclusive and exhaustive) alternatives in a linear order. Let

K be the set of all strict orderings  over K (asymmetric, transitive, and con-
nected binary relations). Informally, K can represent any set of distinct objects,
e.g., policy options, candidates, social states, or distributions of goods, and an
ordering  over K can have any interpretation consistent with a linear form (e.g.,
better than, preferable to, higher than, more competent than, less unequal
thanetc.).
Now, for any two distinct alternatives x and y in K, let x  y denote the
event that x is ranked above y; i.e., x  y denotes the subset of 
K consisting of
all those orderings  in 
K such that x  y. We dene the preference agenda as
the set
XK = fx  y : x; y 2 K with x 6= yg;
which is non-empty and closed under complementation, as required for an agenda
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(this construction draws on Dietrich and List 2007a). In our opinion pooling
problem, each individual i submits probability assignments for the events in XK ,
and the group then determines corresponding collective probability assignments.
An agents opinion function P : XK ! [0; 1] can be interpreted as capturing the
agents degrees of belief about which of the various pairwise comparisons x  y
(in XK) are correct; call this the belief interpretation. Thus, for any two distinct
alternatives x and y in K, P (x  y) can be interpreted as the agents degree
of belief in the event x  y, i.e., the event that x is ranked above (preferable
to, better than, higher than ...) y. (On a di¤erent interpretation, the vague-
preference interpretation, P (x  y) could represent the degree to which the agent
prefers x to y, so that the present framework would capture vague preferences over
alternatives as opposed to degrees of belief about how they are ranked in terms
of the appropriate linear criterion.) A pooling function, as dened above, maps n
individual such opinion functions to a single collective one.
What are the structural properties of this preference agenda?
Lemma 9 For a preference agenda XK, the conditions of non-nestedness, non-
simplicity, and path-connectedness are equivalent, and are each satised if and
only if jKj > 2; the condition of partitionality is violated for any K.
The proof that the preference agenda is non-nested if and only if jKj > 2 is
trivial. The analogous claims for non-simplicity and path-connectedness are well-
established in binary judgment-aggregation theory, to which we refer the reader.14
Finally, it is easy to show that any preference agenda violates partitionality.
Since the preference agenda is non-nested, non-simple, and path-connected
when jKj > 2, Theorems 1(a), 2(a), 3(a), 4(a), and 5(a) apply; but Theorem 6(a)
does not, because partitionality is violated. Let us here focus on Theorem 5. This
theorem has the following corollary for the preference agenda:
Corollary 2 For a preference agenda XK,
(a) if jKj > 2, every pooling function F : PnX ! PX satisfying independence
and conditional consensus compatibility is linear;
(b) if jKj = 2, there exists a non-linear pooling function F : PnX ! PX satisfying
independence and conditional consensus compatibility.
It is interesting to compare this result with Arrows theorem. While Arrows
theorem yields a negative conclusion if jKj > 2 (showing that only dictatorial
aggregation functions satisfy its requirements), our linearity result does not have
14To see for instance that XK is non-simple if jKj > 2, choose three distinct alternatives
x; y; z 2 K and note that the events x  y; y  z; and z  x in XK are mutually inconsistent,
but any pair of them is consistent, so that these three events form a minimal inconsistent subset
of XK .
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any negative avour. Furthermore, we obtain this positive result despite the fact
that our axiomatic requirements are comparable to Arrows. Independence, in our
framework, is the probabilistic analogue of Arrows independence of irrelevant al-
ternatives: for any pair of distinct alternatives x; y in K, the collective probability
for x  y should depend only on individual probabilities for x  y. Conditional
consensus compatibility is a strengthened analogue of Arrows weak Pareto prin-
ciple (an exact analogue would be consensus preservation): it requires that, for
any two pairs of distinct alternatives, x; y 2 K and v; w 2 K, if all individuals
are certain that x  y given that v  w, then this agreement should be preserved
at the collective level. The analogues of Arrows universal domain and collective
rationality are built into our denition of a pooling function, whose domain and
co-domain are dened as the set of all (by denition coherent) opinion functions
over XK .
Thus our result points towards an alternative escape-route from Arrows im-
possibility theorem (though it may be practically applicable only in special con-
texts): if we enrich Arrows informational framework by allowing degrees of belief
over di¤erent possible linear orderings as input and output of the aggregation (or
alternatively, vague preferences, understood probabilistically), then we can avoid
Arrows dictatorship conclusion. Instead, we obtain a positive characterization
of linear pooling, despite imposing requirements on the pooling function that are
stronger than Arrows classic requirements (in so far as conditional consensus
compatibility is stronger than the analogue of the weak Pareto principle).
On the belief interpretation, the present informational framework is meaningful
so long as there exists a fact of the matter about which of the orderings  in

K is the correct one (e.g., an objective quality ordering), so that it makes
sense to form beliefs about this fact. On the vague-preference interpretation, our
framework requires that vague preferences over pairs of alternatives are extendible
to a coherent probability distribution over the set of crisporderings  in 
K .
There are, of course, substantial bodies of literature on avoiding Arrows dic-
tatorship conclusion in richer informational frameworks and on probabilistic or
vague preference aggregation. It is well known, for example, that the introduc-
tion of interpersonally comparable preferences (of an ordinal or cardinal type) is
su¢ cient for avoiding Arrows negative conclusion (e.g., Sen 1970/1979). Also,
di¤erent models of probabilistic or vague preference aggregation have been inves-
tigated. A model in which individuals and the collective specify probabilities of
selecting each of the alternatives inK (as opposed to probability assignments over
events of the form x is ranked above y) has been studied, for instance, by Intrili-
gator (1973), who has characterized a version of linear averaging in it. Similarly,
a model in which individuals have vague or fuzzy preferences has been studied, for
instance, by Billot (1991) and more recently by Piggins and Perote-Peña (2007)
(see also Sanver and Selçuk 2009). In such a model, for any pair of alternatives
x; y 2 K, each individual prefers x to y to a certain degree between 0 and 1.
However, the standard constraints on vague or fuzzy preferences do not require
22
individuals to hold probabilistically coherent opinion functions in our sense; hence
the literature has tended to generate Arrow-style impossibility results. By con-
trast, it is illuminating to see that a possibility result on probabilistic preference
aggregation can be derived as a corollary of one of our new results on probabilistic
opinion pooling.
9 A unied perspective
Finally, we wish to compare probabilistic opinion pooling, as discussed here, with
binary judgment aggregation and Arrovian preference aggregation in its original
form. Thanks to the notion of a general agenda, we can represent each of these
other aggregation problems within the present framework.
 To represent binary judgment aggregation, we simply need to restrict at-
tention to binary opinion functions, i.e., opinion functions that take only
the values 0 and 1.15 Binary opinion functions correspond to consistent and
complete judgment sets in judgment-aggregation theory, i.e., sets of the form
J  X which satisfy \A2JA 6= ? (consistency) and contain a member of
each pair A;Ac 2 X (completeness).16 A binary opinion pooling function as-
signs to each prole of binary opinion functions a collective binary opinion
function. Thus, binary opinion pooling functions correspond to standard
judgment aggregation functions (with universal domain and consistent and
complete outputs).
 To represent preference aggregation, we need to restrict attention both to the
preference agenda, as introduced in Section 8, and to binary opinion func-
tions, as just dened. Binary opinion functions for the preference agenda
correspond to linear preference orders, as familiar from preference aggrega-
tion theory in the tradition of Arrow. Here, binary opinion pooling functions
correspond to Arrovian social welfare functions.
The literature on binary judgment aggregation contains several theorems that
use axiomatic requirements very similar to those we have used here. In the binary
case, however, these requirements lead to dictatorial, rather than linear, aggrega-
tion, as in Arrows original impossibility theorem in preference-aggregation theory.
In fact, Arrow-like theorems are immediate corollaries of the results on judgment
aggregation, when applied to the preference agenda (e.g., Dietrich and List 2007a,
List and Pettit 2004). In particular, the independence requirement reduces to
Arrows independence of irrelevant alternatives, and the unanimity-preservation
requirements reduce to variants of the Pareto principle.
15Formally, a binary opinion function is a function f : X ! f0; 1g that is extendible to a
probability function on (X), or equivalently, to a truth-function on (X) (i.e., a f0; 1g-valued
function on (X) that is logically consistent).
16Specically, a binary opinion function f : X ! f0; 1g corresponds to the consistent and
complete judgment set fA 2 X : f(A) = 1g.
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How can the same axiomatic requirements lead to a positive conclusion 
linearity in the probabilistic framework and to a negative one dictatorship 
in the binary case? The reason is that, in the binary case, linearity collapses into
dictatorship because the only well-dened linear pooling functions are dictatorial
here. Let us explain this point. Linearity of a binary opinion pooling function F
is dened just as in the probabilistic framework: there exist real-valued weights
w1; :::; wn  0 with w1 + ::: + wn = 1 such that, for every prole (P1; :::; Pn) of
binary opinion functions, the collective truth-value of any given event A in the
agenda X is the weighted arithmetic average w1P1(A) +    + wnPn(A). Yet, for
this to dene a proper binary opinion pooling function, some individual i must
get a weight of 1 and all others must get a weight of 0, since otherwise the average
w1P1(A) +   +wnPn(A) could fall strictly between 0 and 1, violating the binary
restriction. In other words, linearity is equivalent to dictatorship here.17
We can obtain a unied perspective on several distinct aggregation problems
by combining this papers linearity results with the corresponding dictatorship
results from the existing literature (adopting the unication strategy proposed
in Dietrich and List 2010). This yields several unied characterization theorems
applicable to probability aggregation, judgment aggregation, and preference ag-
gregation. Let us state these results. The rst combines Theorem 4 with a result
due to Dietrich (2013); the second combines Theorem 5 with a result due to Di-
etrich and List (2013a); and the third combines Theorem 6 with the analogue of
Arrows theorem in judgment aggregation (Dietrich and List 2007a and Dokow
and Holzman 2010). In the binary case, the independence requirement and our
various unanimity requirements are dened as in the probabilistic framework, but
with a restriction to binary opinion functions.18
Theorem 4+ (a) For any non-nested agenda X with jXnf
;?gj > 4, every
binary or probabilistic opinion pooling function satisfying independence
and consensus compatibility is linear (where linearity reduces to dictatorship
in the binary case).
(b) For any other agenda X ( 6= f?;
g), there exists a non-linear binary or
probabilistic opinion pooling function satisfying independence and consen-
sus compatibility.
Theorem 5+ (a) For any non-simple agenda X with jXnf
;?gj > 4, every
17To be precise, for (trivial) agendas with Xnf
;?g = ?, the weights wi may di¤er from 1
and 0. But it still follows that every linear binary opinion pooling function (in fact, every binary
opinion pooling function) is dictatorial here, for the trivial reason that there is only one binary
opinion function and thus only one (dictatorial) binary opinion pooling function.
18In the binary case, two of our unanimity-preservation requirements namely implicit consen-
sus preservation and consensus compatibility become equivalent, because every binary opinion
function is uniquely extendible to (X). Also, conditional consensus compatibility can be stated
more easily in the binary case, namely in terms of a single conditional judgment rather than a
nite set of conditional judgments.
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binary or probabilistic opinion pooling function satisfying independence
and conditional consensus compatibility is linear (where linearity reduces to
dictatorship in the binary case).
(b) For any simple agenda X (nite and distinct from f?;
g), there exists
a non-linear binary or probabilistic opinion pooling function satisfying
independence and conditional consensus compatibility.
Theorem 6+ (a) For any path-connected and partitional agenda X, every bi-
nary or probabilistic opinion pooling function satisfying independence and
consensus preservation is linear (where linearity reduces to dictatorship in
the binary case).
(b) For any non-path-connected (nite) agenda X, there exists a non-linear bi-
nary or probabilistic opinion pooling function satisfying independence and
consensus preservation.19
By Lemma 9, Theorems 4+, 5+, and 6+ are relevant to preference aggrega-
tion insofar as the preference agenda XK satises each of non-nestedness, non-
simplicity, and path-connectedness if and only if jKj > 2, where K is the set of
alternatives. Recall, however, that the preference agenda is never partitional, so
that part (a) of Theorem 6+ never applies. By contrast, the binary result on which
part (a) is based applies to the preference agenda, as it uses the weaker condition
of even-number-negatability (or non-a¢ neness) instead of partitionality (and that
weaker condition is satised by XK if jKj > 2). As noted above, it remains an
open question how far partitionality can be weakened in the probabilistic case.20
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A Proofs
In this appendix, we prove all our results. Given the close mathematical connec-
tion between the present results and those in our companion paper on premise-
basedopinion pooling for a -algebra agenda (Dietrich and List 2013b), there
are in principle two plausible proof strategies: either we could prove our present
results directly and those in the companion paper as corollaries, or vice versa. As
it turns out, mixing these two strategies is the most natural approach. We will
prove parts (a) of most of our present theorems directly (and use them in the
companion paper to derive the results stated there), while we will derive parts (b)
of most of our present theorems from the corresponding results in the companion
paper.
Section A.1 provides some preparatory lemmas needed to establish a trans-
lation between the two papers. Sections A.2, A.3, ..., A.7 contain the proofs of
Theorems 1, 2, ..., 6, together with some related results. Finally, Section A.8
contains the proof of Proposition 2.
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A.1 The relationship with premise-basedopinion pooling
for a -algebra agenda
We now relate opinion pooling on a general agenda X to opinion pooling on a
-algebra agenda, as analysed in our companion paper. This technical connection
will be exploited in our proofs.
Consider any agenda X, and any -algebra agenda  of which X is a sub-
agenda. (A subagenda of an agenda is a subset which is itself an agenda, i.e., a
non-empty set closed under complementation.) For instance,  could be (X).
We can think of the pooling function F for X as being induced by a pooling func-
tion F  for the larger agenda . Formally, a pooling function F  : Pn ! P for
agenda  is said to induce the pooling function F : PnX ! PX for (sub)agenda X
if F  and F generate the same collective opinions within X, i.e.,
F (P1jX ; :::; PnjX) = F (P1; :::; Pn)jX for all P1; :::; Pn 2 P:
(Strictly speaking, we further require that PX = fP jX : P 2 Pg, but this
requirement holds automatically in standard cases, e.g., if X is nite or (X) =
.21) We will call F  the inducing pooling function, and F the induced pooling
function.
Our axiomatic requirements on the induced pooling function F i.e., indepen-
dence and the various consensus requirements can be related to the following
axiomatic requirements on the inducing pooling function F  for the agenda 
(introduced and discussed in the companion paper):
Independence on X. For each A in subagenda X, there exists a function DA :
[0; 1]n ! [0; 1] (the local pooling criterion for A) such that, for all P1; :::; Pn 2 P,
PP1;:::;Pn(A) = DA(P1(A); :::; Pn(A)).
Consensus preservation. For all A 2  and all P1; :::; Pn 2 P, if Pi(A) = 1
for all individuals i then PP1;:::;Pn(A) = 1.
Consensus preservation on X. For all A in subagenda X and all P1; :::; Pn 2
P, if Pi(A) = 1 for all individuals i then PP1;:::;Pn(A) = 1.
Conditional consensus preservation on X. For all A;B in subagenda X and
all P1; :::; Pn 2 P, if, for each individual i, Pi(AjB) = 1 (provided Pi(B) 6= 0),
21In these cases, each opinion function in PX is extendable not just to a probability measure
on (X), but also to one on . In general, extensions beyond (X) may not always be possible,
as is well-known from measure theory. For instance, if 
 = R, X consists of all intervals or
complements thereof, and  = 2R, then (X) contains the Borel-measurable subsets of R, and
it is well-known that measures on (X) may not extend to  = 2R (a fact related to the
Banach-Tarski paradox).
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then PP1;:::;Pn(AjB) = 1 (provided PP1;:::;Pn(B) 6= 0).22
The following lemma establishes some key relationships between the properties
of the induced and the inducing pooling functions.
Lemma 10 Suppose a pooling function F  for a -algebra agenda  induces a
pooling function F for a subagenda X (where X is nite or (X) = ). Then:
 F is independent (respectively, neutral, linear) if and only if F  is indepen-
dent (respectively, neutral, linear) on X;
 F is consensus-preserving if and only if F  is consensus-preserving on X;
 F is consensus-compatible if F  is consensus-preserving;
 F is conditional-consensus-compatible if F  is conditional-consensus-preserving
on X.
In fact, this lemma is a corollary of a more general result on the correspondence
between opinion pooling on a general agenda and opinion pooling on a larger -
algebra agenda.23
Lemma 11 Consider an agenda X and the corresponding -algebra agenda  =
(X). Any pooling function for X is
(a) induced by some pooling function for agenda ;
(b) independent (respectively, neutral, linear) if and only if every inducing pool-
ing function for agenda  is independent (respectively, neutral, linear) on
X, where everycan further be replaced by some;
(c) consensus-preserving if and only if every inducing pooling function for agenda
 is consensus-preserving on X, where every can further be replaced by
some;
(d) consensus-compatible if and only if some inducing pooling function for agenda
 is consensus-preserving;
(e) conditional-consensus-compatible if and only if some inducing pooling func-
tion for agenda  is conditional-consensus-preserving on X
(where in (d) and (e) the only ifclaim assumes that X is nite).
22When comparing this requirement to conditional consensus compatibility for a general
agenda X, one might wonder why the new requirement involves only a single conditional cer-
tainty (i.e., that of A given B), whereas the earlier requirement involves an entire set of condi-
tional certainties (which must be respected simultaneously). The key point is that when each Pi
is a probability function on , then the simplied requirement as stated here implies the more
complicated requirement from the main text.
23More precisely, Lemma 10 is a corollary of a slightly generalized statement of Lemma 11, in
which  is either (X) or, if X is nite, any -algebra which includes X. Our proof of Lemma
11 can be extended to this generalized statement (drawing on Lemma 12 and using an argument
related to the Claimin the proof of Theorem 1(b) of the companion paper).
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The proof of Lemma 11 draws on the following measure-theoretic fact (in which
the word niteis essential):
Lemma 12 Every probability function on a nite sub--algebra of -algebra 
can be extended to a probability function on .
Proof. Let 0   be a nite sub--algebra of -algebra , and consider
any P 0 2 P0. Let A be the set of atoms of 0, i.e., of (-)minimal events in
0nf?g. Using the fact that 0 is nite, it easily follows that A partitions 
. So,X
A2A
P 0(A) = 1. For each A 2 A, let QA be a probability function on  such
that QA(A) = 1. (Such functions exist, since each QA could for instance be the
Dirac measure in a point !A 2 A.) Then
P :=
X
A2A
P 0(A)QA
denes a probability function on, because (by the identity
X
A2A:P 0(A) 6=0
P 0(A) =
1) it is a convex combination of probability functions on . Further, P extends
P 0 because it agrees with P 0 on A, hence on all of 0. 
Proof of Lemma 11. Consider an agenda X, the generated -algebra  =
(X), and a pooling function F for X.
(a) For each P 2 PX , x any extension in P, to be denoted P . Consider the
pooling function F  for  dened by
F (P 1 ; :::; P

n) = F (P

1 jX ; :::; P n jX) for all P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P.
Clearly, F  induces F (regardless of how the extensions P of P 2 PX were chosen).
(b) We give a proof for the independencecase; the proofs for the neutrality
and linearitycases are analogous. Note (using part (a)) that replacing every
by somestrengthens the ifclaim and weakens the only ifclaim. It therefore
su¢ ces to prove the ifclaim with some, and the only ifclaim with every.
First let F be independent with pooling criteria DA; A 2 X. Consider any
F  : Pn ! Pn inducing F . Then F  is independent on X with the same pooling
criteria as for F , because for all A 2 X and all P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P we have
F (P 1 ; :::; P

n)(A) = F (P

1 jX ; :::; P n jX)(A) as F  induces F
= DA(P

1 jX(A); :::; P n jX(A)) by Fs independence
= DA(P

1 (A); :::; P

n(A)).
Now suppose some inducing pooling function F  is independent onX. Clearly,
F inherits independence from F .
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(c) As in part (b), replacing everywith somestrengthens the ifclaim and
weakens the only ifclaim, so that it su¢ ces to prove the ifclaim with some,
and the only if claim with every. First, let F be consensus-preserving, and
consider any inducing F . Then F  is consensus-preserving on X because, for all
A 2 X and all P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P such that P 1 (A) =    = P n(A) = 1, we have
F (P 1 ; :::; P

n)(A) = F (P

1 jX ; :::; P n jX)(A) as F  induces F
= 1 as F is consensus preserving.
Now suppose some inducing F  is consensus-preserving on X. It is clear that
F inherits consensus preservation from F .
(d) First, let F be consensus-compatible, and let X be nite. We dene F 
as follows. For any prole P 1 ; :::; P

n 2 P, we rst form the event A in  which
is smallest (with respect to set-inclusion) subject to having probability one under
each P i ; to see why this event exists, note that the intersection of nitely many
events of probability one has probability one, so that (since  = (X) is nite) we
can construct A as the intersection \A2(X):P 1 (A)==P n(A)=1A. In other words, A
is the union of the supports of the functions P i . We dene F
(P 1 ; :::; P

n) as any
extension in P of F (A1jX ; ::::; AnjX) assigning probability one to A. Such an
extension exists because F is consensus-compatible and each P i jX is extendable to
a probability function (namely P i ) assigning probability one to A
. The so-dened
pooling function F  clearly induces F . It is also consensus-preserving since, for any
P 1 ; :::; P

n 2 P and any event A 2 , if P 1 (A) =    = P n(A) = 1, then A  A
(where A is the event constructed as above), and thus F (P 1 ; :::; P

n)(A) = 1
since F (P 1 ; :::; P

n)(A
) = 1.
Conversely, assume some inducing F  is consensus-preserving. To see why F
is consensus-compatible, we consider any P1; :::; Pn 2 PX and any A 2  such that
each Pi has an extension P i 2 P for which P i(A) = 1. We have to show that there
is an extension P 2 P of F (P1; :::; Pn) such that P (A) = 1. Simply dene P as
F (P 1; :::; P n) and note that it is indeed the case that (i) P extends F (P1; :::; Pn),
since F  induces F , and (ii) P (A) = 1 since F  is consensus-preserving.
(e) First, let F be conditional-consensus-compatible, and let X be nite. We
dene F  as follows. For any prole (P 1 ; :::; P

n) 2 Pn, rst form the (nite) set S
of all pairs (A;B) in X such that P i (AjB) = 1 for each i with P i (B) 6= 0 (equiva-
lently, such that P i (BnA) = 0 for each i). By the conditional consensus compati-
bility of F (and the fact that in the last sentence we could of course have replaced
each P i by P

i jX), there is an extension P  2 P of F (P 1 jX ; :::; P n jX) such that
P (AjB) = 1 for all (A;B) 2 S for which P (B) 6= 0. We dene F (P 1 ; :::; P n) as
P . Clearly, F  induces F and is conditional-consensus-preserving on X.
Conversely, let some inducing F  be conditional-consensus-preserving on X.
To check that F is conditional-consensus-compatible, consider any P1; :::; Pn 2 PX
and any nite set S of pairs (A;B) in X such that each Pi extends to a P i 2 P
with P i(AjB) = 1 (provided P i(B) 6= 0). We need to nd an extension P  2 P
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of F (P1; :::; Pn) such that P (AjB) = 1 for all (A;B) 2 S for which P (B) 6= 0.
The function P  := F (P 1; :::; P n) is such an extension, because F  induces F
and is conditional-consensus-preserving on X. 
Given a pooling function F  for the -algebra agenda , does it induce any
pooling function for subagenda X? The following result gives a su¢ cient condi-
tion.
Lemma 13 If a pooling function for a -algebra agenda  is independent on a
subagenda X (where X is nite or (X) = ), then it induces a pooling function
for agenda X.
Proof of Lemma 13. Suppose pooling function F for -algebra agenda 
is independent on the subagenda X, and that X is nite or (X) = . Let
0 := (X). Notice that if X is nite, so is 0. Each P 2 PX by denition
extends to a function in P0, which, using Lemma 12 if 0 is a (nite) -algebra
distinct from , extends to a function in P. For any Q 2 PX let Q 2 P be an
extension. Dene a pooling function F 0 for X by
F 0(Q1; :::; Qn) := F (Q1; :::; Qn)jX for all Q1; :::; Qn 2 PX .
Now F induces F 0 for the following two reasons. First, for all P1; :::; Pn 2 P,
F 0(P1jX ; :::; PnjX) = F (P1jX ; :::; PnjX)jX
= F (P1; :::; Pn)jX (as F is independent on X).
Second, the identity PX = fP jX : P 2 Pg holds: is trivial, and holds
because each P 2 PX can be written as P jX . 
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of Theorem 1. (a) This part follows from Theorem 2(a), since consensus
compatibility implies conditional consensus compatibility.
(b) We reduce this part to the companion papers Theorem 1(b). Consider a
nested agenda X 6= f?;
g. By the companion papers Theorem 1(b) (see also the
footnote to that theorem), there is a pooling function F  for the agenda  := (X)
which is independent on X, (globally) consensus preserving, but not neutral on
X. By independence on X, this pooling function induces a pooling function for
the (sub)agenda X (see Lemma 13). This pooling function is independent and
consensus-compatible and not neutral (see Lemma 10). 
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A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
As mentioned, Theorem 2(a) is based on the above Lemmas 1 and 2. To prove
these, we rst show the following lemma.
Lemma 14 Consider any agenda X.
(a)  denes an equivalence relation on Xnf?;
g:
(b) A  B , Ac  Bc for all events A;B 2 Xnf?;
g.
(c) A  B ) A  B for all events A;B 2 Xnf?;
g.
(d) If X 6= f?;
g, the relation  has
 either a single equivalence class, namely Xnf?;
g,
 or exactly two equivalence classes, each one containing exactly one
member of each pair A;Ac 2 Xnf?;
g.
Proof of Lemma 14. (a) Reexivity, symmetry, and transitivity on Xnf?;
g
are all obvious (we have excluded ? and 
 to ensure reexivity).
(b) It su¢ ces to show one direction of implication (as (Ac)c = A for all A 2 X).
Let A;B 2 Xnf?;
g with A  B. Then there is a path A1; :::; Ak 2 X from
A to B such that any neighbours Aj; Aj+1 are not exclusive and not exhaustive.
It follows that Ac1; :::; A
c
k is a path from A
c to Bc, where any neighbours Acj; A
c
j+1
are not exclusive (as Acj \Acj+1 = (Aj [Aj+1)c 6= 
c = ?) and not exhaustive (as
Acj [ Acj+1 = (Aj \ Aj+1)c 6= ?c = 
). So, Ac  Bc.
(c) Let A;B 2 Xnf?;
g. If A  B, then A  B in virtue of a direct
connection, because A;B are neither exclusive (as A\B = A 6= ?) nor exhaustive
(as A [B = B 6= 
).
(d) Let X 6= f?;
g. Suppose the number of equivalence classes with respect
to  is not one. As Xnf?;
g 6= ?, it is not zero. So it is at least two. We show
two claims:
Claim 1. There are exactly two equivalence classes with respect to .
Claim 2. Each class contains exactly one member of any pairA;Ac 2 Xnf?;
g.
Proof of Claim 1. For a contradiction, let A;B;C 2 Xnf?;
g be pairwise
not equivalent with respect to . By A 6 B, either A \ B = ? or A [ B = 
.
Without loss of generality, we may assume the former case, because in the latter
case we may consider the complements Ac; Bc; Cc instead of A;B;C, using the
fact that Ac; Bc; Cc are pairwise not equivalent with respect to  by (b) with
Ac \ Bc = (A [ B)c = 
c = ?. Now by A \ B = ?, we have B  Ac, whence
Ac  B by (c). By A 6 C, there are two cases:
 either A \ C = ?, which implies C  Ac, whence C  Ac by (c), so that
C  B (as Ac  B and  is transitive by (a)), a contradiction;
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 or A [ C = 
, which implies Ac  C, whence Ac  C by (c), so that again
we derive the contradiction C  B, which completes the proof of Claim 1.
Proof of Claim 2. Suppose, for a contradiction, that Z is an equivalence class
with respect to  containing the pair A;Ac. By assumption, Z is not the only
equivalence class with respect to , and so there is a B 2 Xnf?;
g with B 6 A
(hence B 6 Ac). Then either A\B = ? or A[B = 
. In the rst case, B  Ac,
so that B  Ac by (c), a contradiction. In the second case, Ac  B, so that
Ac  B by (c), a contradiction. 
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider an agenda X 6= f?;
g. By Lemma 14(a), 
is indeed an equivalence relation on Xnf?;
g. By Lemma 14(d), it remains to
prove that X is nested if and only if there are exactly two equivalence classes.
Note that X is nested if and only if Xnf?;
g is nested, so that we may assume
without loss of generality that ?;
 =2 X.
First suppose there are two equivalence classes with respect to . Let X+ be
one of them. By Lemma 14(d), X = fA;Ac : A 2 X+g. To complete the proof
that X is nested, we show that X+ is linearly ordered by set-inclusion . As  is
reexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric, what we have to show is connectedness.
So, suppose A;B 2 X+, and let us show that A  B or B  A. Since A 6 Bc
(by Lemma 14(d)), either A \ Bc = ? or A [ Bc = 
. In the rst case, A  B.
In the second case, B  A.
Conversely, let X be nested, i.e., of the form X = fA;Ac : A 2 X+g for
some set X+   that is linearly ordered by set-inclusion . Consider any
A 2 X+. We show that A 6 Ac, which shows that X has more than one hence
by Lemma 14(d) exactly two equivalence classes with respect to , as desired.
For a contradiction, suppose A  Ac. Then there is a path A1; :::; Ak 2 X from
A = A1 to Ac = Ak such that, for all neighbours Aj; Aj+1, Aj \ Aj+1 6= ? and
Aj [ Aj+1 6= 
. As each event C 2 X is either in X+ or has complement in X+,
and as A1 = A 2 X+ and Ack = A 2 X+, there are neighbours Aj; Aj+1 such
that Aj; Acj+1 2 X+. So, as X+ is linearly ordered by , either Aj  Acj+1 or
Acj+1  Aj. In the rst case, Aj \ Aj+1 = ?, a contradiction. In the second case,
Aj [ Aj+1 = 
, also a contradiction. 
Before proving Lemma 2, we give a useful re-formulation of the condition of
conditional consensus compatibility for opinion pooling on a general agenda X.
Note rst that an opinion function is consistent with certainty of A (2 X) given B
(2 X) if and only if it is consistent with certainty of the event B implies A, i.e.,
with zero probability of BnA, the event that B holds without A. So, conditional
consensus compatibility can be re-formulated as the following condition (in which
the roles of A and B have been interchanged):
Implication preservation. For all P1; :::; Pn 2 PX , and all nite sets S of pairs
(A;B) of events in X, if every opinion function Pi is consistent with certainty
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that A implies B for all (A;B) in S (i.e., some extension P i 2 P(X) of Pi satises
P i(AnB) = 0 for all pairs (A;B) 2 S), then so is the collective opinion function
PP1;:::;Pn.
The following proposition states what has just been (informally) shown:
Proposition 3 For any agenda X, conditional consensus compatibility is equiv-
alent to implication preservation.
We are ready to prove Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let F be an independent and conditional-consensus-
compatible pooling function for agenda X. For each A 2 X, let DA be the pooling
criterion as given by independence. We show that DA = DB for all A;B 2 X with
A \ B 6= ? and A [ B 6= 
. This implies immediately that DA = DB whenever
A  B (by induction on the length k of a path from A to B), completing the
proof.
So, suppose A;B 2 X with A\B 6= ? and A[B 6= 
. Notice that the events
A \ B, A [ B and AnB need not belong to X. Consider any x 2 [0; 1]n, and let
us show that DA(x) = DB(x). As A\B 6= ? and Ac \Bc = (A[B)c 6= ?, there
exist probability functions P 1 ; :::; P

n 2 P(X) such that
P i (A \B) = xi and P i (Ac \Bc) = 1  xi, for all i = 1; :::; n.
Now consider the opinion functions P1; :::; Pn 2 PX given by Pi := P i jX for
each individual i. Since P i (AnB) = 0 and P i (BnA) = 0 for all i, the collective
opinion function PP1;:::;Pn has an extension P

P1;:::;Pn
2 P(X) such that
P P1;:::;Pn(AnB) = P P1;:::;Pn(BnA) = 0
by implication preservation (which is equivalent to conditional consensus compat-
ibility by Proposition 3). It follows that
P P1;:::;Pn(A) = P

P1;:::;Pn
(A \B) = P P1;:::;Pn(B).
Hence,
PP1;:::;Pn(A) = PP1;:::;Pn(B).
So, using the fact that PP1;:::;Pn(A) = DA(x) (because Pi(A) = xi for all i) and
PP1;:::;Pn(B) = DB(x) (because Pi(B) = xi for all i), it follows that DA(x) =
DB(x), as desired. 
Proof of Theorem 2. (a) This part follows immediately from Lemmas 1 and 2.
(b) This part follows from Theorem 1(b) because consensus compatibility im-
plies conditional consensus compatibility (by Proposition 1). 
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A.4 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof of Lemma 3. Let F : PnX ! PX be independent and consensus-preserving,
and consider A;B 2 X. Suppose A ` B, say in virtue of (countable) set Y 
X. Write DA and DB for the pooling criteria for A and B, respectively. Let
x = (x1; :::; xn) 2 [0; 1]n. We show that DA(x)  DB(x). As \C2fAg[YC is
non-empty but has empty intersection with Bc (by the conditional entailment), it
equals its intersection with B, and so \C2fA;Bg[YC 6= ?. Similarly, as \C2fBcg[YC
is non-empty but has empty intersection with A, it equals its intersection with
Ac, so that \C2fAc;Bcg[YC 6= ?. Hence there are worlds ! 2 \C2fA;Bg[YC and
!0 2 \C2fAc;Bcg[YC. For each individual i, consider the probability function
P i : (X)! [0; 1] dened by
P i := xi! + (1  xi)!0,
where !; !0 : (X)! [0; 1] denote the Dirac-measures in ! and !0, respectively;
and consider the opinion function Pi := P i jX . As each Pi satises Pi(A) =
Pi(B) = xi, we have
PP1;:::;Pn(A) = DA(P1(A); :::; Pn(A)) = DA(x),
PP1;:::;Pn(B) = DB(P1(B); :::; Pn(B)) = DB(x).
Further, for each Pi and each C 2 Y we have Pi(C) = 1, so that PP1;:::;Pn(C) = 1
(by consensus preservation), and hence PP1;:::;Pn(\C2YC) = 1 since the intersection
of countably many events of probability one has again probability one. So
PP1;:::;Pn(\C2fAg[YC) = PP1;:::;Pn(A) = DA(x),
PP1;:::;Pn(\C2fBg[YC) = PP1;:::;Pn(B) = DB(x).
So, to prove that DA(x)  DB(x), it su¢ ces to show that PP1;:::;Pn(\C2fAg[YC) 
PP1;:::;Pn(\C2fBg[YC). This is true because
\C2fAg[YC = \C2fA;Bg[Y  \C2fBg[YC,
where the equality holds by an earlier argument. 
Proof of Theorem 3. (a) Let X be path-connected, and let F be independent
and consensus-preserving. We show neutrality. Without loss of generality, let
X 6= f?;
g. We write DA for the local pooling criterion of any contingent event
A 2 Xnf?;
g. As X is path-connected, repeated application of Lemma 3 yields
DA  DB for all A;B 2 Xnf?;
g, and hence DA = DB for all A;B 2 Xnf?;
g.
Dene D as the common pooling criterion DA of all A 2 Xnf?;
g. We complete
the neutrality proof by showing that D also works as a pooling criterion for 
 and
?. This follows from the fact that, as a consequence of consensus preservation,
D(1) = 1 and D(0) = 0.
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(b) This part is reducible to the companion papers Theorem 3(b). Consider
a non-path-connected nite agenda X. By the companion papers Theorem 3(b),
there is a pooling function F  for agenda  := (X) which, on X, is independent
and consensus-preserving but not neutral. By independence on X, this pooling
function induces a pooling function for (sub)agenda X (see Lemma 13), which is
independent and consensus-preserving but not neutral (see Lemma 10). 
A.5 Proof of Theorem 4
The proof of Theorem 4(a) (specically, of Lemma 4) draws on the following
agenda characterization result.
Proposition 4 For any agenda X, the following are equivalent:
(a) X is non-nested with jXnf
;?gj > 4;
(b) X has a (consistent or inconsistent) subset Y with jY j  3 such that
(Y nfAg) [ fAcg is consistent for each A 2 Y ;
(c) X has a (consistent or inconsistent) subset Y with jY j = 3 such that
(Y nfAg) [ fAcg is consistent for each A 2 Y .
Proof. LetX be an agenda. The equivalence between (b) and (c) is obvious (to
see why (b) implies (c), simply replace the set Y in (b) by a three-member subset
of it). It is also relatively easy to see why (c) implies (a). Indeed, whenever
(a) is violated, so is (c), by the following argument. First, if jXnf
;?gj  4,
then (c) is violated since every three-element set Y  X either contains 
 or
? (so that Y nfAg [ fAcg is inconsistent for some A 2 Y ) or takes the form
Y = fB;Bc; Ag (so that Y nfAg [ fAcg is inconsistent). Second, if the agenda X
is nested, sayX = fC;Cc : C 2 Zg for some subset Z  X that is linearly ordered
by set-inclusion, condition (c) is violated since any three-element set Y  X has
elements A 6= B which both belong to Z or both belong to fAc : A 2 Zg; so
that (by the linearity of Z and of fCc : C 2 Zg) A  B or B  A, and hence,
(Y nfBg) [ fBcg is inconsistent or (Y nfAg) [ fAcg is inconsistent.
It remains to show that (a) implies (c). LetX be non-nested with jXnf
;?gj >
4; we show (c). Without loss of generality, we may assume that 
;? 62 X (since
otherwise it su¢ ces to do the proof for Xnf
;?g instead of X, drawing on the
fact that each of the conditions (a) and (c) holds for X if and only if it holds for
Xnf
;?g). We distinguish between two cases.
Case 1 : Some A;B 2 X are logically independent, i.e., all of A \ B; A \ Bc;
Ac \B and Ac \Bc are non-empty. Consider such A;B 2 X. Since jXj > 4 there
is a C 2 XnfA;Ac; B;Bcg. As C is non-empty, it intersects with at least one of
A \ B; A \ Bc; Ac \ B and Ac \ Bc. We may assume without loss of generality
that A \ Bc \ C 6= ? (otherwise, simply interchange A with Ac and/or B with
Bc). Our argument distinguishes between two subcases.
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Subcase 1.1 : Ac\Bc\Cc; A\B\Cc 6= ?. In this case, condition (c) holds for
Y := fA;Bc; Ccg, since Ac \Bc \Cc 6= ?, A\B \Cc 6= ? and A\Bc \C 6= ?.
Subcase 1.2 : Ac\Bc\Cc = ? or A\B\Cc = ? (perhaps both). We assume
without loss of generality that A\B \Cc = ?, i.e., that A\B  C. (The proof
is analogous in the other case.) There are three subsubcases.
Subsubcase 1.2.1 : Ac \B \Cc; A\Bc \Cc 6= ?. Here, condition (c) holds for
Y := fA;B;Ccg, sinceAc\B\Cc 6= ?, A\Bc\Cc 6= ? andA\B\C = A\B 6= ?.
Subsubcase 1.2.2 : Ac \ B \ Cc = ?. So Ac \ B  C. As also A \ B  C, we
have B  C. We distinguish between cases:
 First assume Ac \ Bc \ Cc 6= ?. Then condition (c) holds with Y =
fAc; Bc; Cg, because A\Bc \C 6= ?, Ac \B \C 6= ? (as Ac \B 6= ? and
B  C) and Ac \Bc \ Cc 6= ?.
 Second assume Ac \ Bc \ Cc = ?, i.e., Ac \ Bc  C. Since also B  C,
we have Cc  A \ Bc. Condition (c) holds with Y = fA;Bc; Cg, because
Ac\Bc\C 6= ? (as ? 6= Ac\Bc  C), A\B\C 6= ? (as ? 6= A\B  C)
and A \Bc \ Cc 6= ? (as ? 6= Cc  A \Bc).
Subsubcase 1.2.3 : A \ Bc \ Cc = ?. (If in the following proof for the current
subcase we interchange A and B, then we obtain an alternative, but longer, proof
for Subsubcase 1.2.2.) Since A \ Bc \ Cc = ? we have A \ Bc  C. As also
A \ B  C, it follows that A  C. So, since C 6= A;
, we have A ( C ( 
. We
now show that
(*) Ac \B \ C;Ac \Bc \ Cc 6= ? or (**) Ac \Bc \ C;Ac \B \ Cc 6= ?: (3)
To show this, we assume that (*) is violated and show that (**) holds, by distin-
guishing between two cases:
 First, assume that Ac \ B \ C = ?. It follows, on the one hand, that
Ac\B\Cc 6= ? (asAc\B 6= ?), and, on the other hand, thatAc\Bc\C 6= ?
(as otherwise Ac \ C = ?, i.e., C  A, a contradiction since A ( C). This
proves (**).
 Second, assume that Ac \ B \ C 6= ?. Then Ac \ Bc \ Cc = ? as (*) is
violated. It follows, one the one hand, that Ac\Bc\C 6= ? (as Ac\Bc 6= ?),
and, on the other hand, that Ac \ B \ Cc 6= ? (as otherwise Ac \ Cc = ?,
i.e., Ac  C, a contradiction since A  C ( 
). This proves (**).
We can now prove condition (c). In the case of (*), (c) holds with Y =
fAc; Bc; Cg, since A \Bc \C 6= ? (as A \Bc 6= ? and A  C), Ac \B \C 6= ?
(by (*)) and Ac \ Bc \ Cc 6= ? (by (*)). In the case of (**), (c) holds with
Y = fAc; B; Cg, since A\B\C 6= ? (as A\B 6= ? and A  C), Ac\Bc\C 6= ?
(by (**)) and Ac \B \ Cc 6= ? (by (**)).
Case 2 : No A;B 2 X are logically independent.
Claim 2.1. There exists a (with respect to set-inclusion) maximal nested (sub-
)agenda X  X.
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This follows from Zorns Lemma using the fact that the set V of nested sub-
agendas V  X is non-empty (because X 6= ? and for any A 2 X we have
fA;Acg 2 V) and the fact that every subset ? 6=W  V that is linearly ordered
with respect to set-inclusion (a chain) has an upper bound in V (namely the
agenda [V 2WV , which is indeed nested, as is easily shown). This proves Claim
2.1.
Since X is nested, we may express it as X = fA;Ac : A 2 X+g where X+ is
a subset of X which contains exactly one member of each pair A;Ac 2 X and
is linearly ordered with respect to set-inclusion.
Claim 2.2. There exists D 2 XnX such that D \ A 6= ? for all A 2 X+.
Since X is nested but X is not, we have X ( X, and thus there are C;Cc 2
XnX. It su¢ ces to show that at least one of the sets C and Cc intersects all
A 2 X+. This is true because otherwise there would exist A;A0 2 X+ such that
C \ A = Cc \ A0 = ?, which (recalling that A  A0 or A0  A, and writing A00
for the smaller one of A and A0) implies that C \A00 = Cc \A00 = ?, hence, that
A00 = ?, a contradiction since ? 62 X. This proves Claim 2.2.
Let
Y1 : = fA 2 X+ : A  Dg;
Y2 : = fA 2 X+ : Ac  Dg:
Claim 2.3. Y1 \ Y2 = ?, and Y1 [ Y2 = X+.
First, Y1\Y2 = ?, because otherwise there would be an A 2 X+ such that A 
D andAc  D, a contradiction asD 6= 
. Second, suppose for a contradiction that
A 2 X+n(Y1 [ Y2). Since A and D are not logically independent (by assumption
of Case 2), and since A \ D 6= ? (by Claim 2.2), A \ Dc 6= ? (as A 62 Y1) and
Ac \Dc 6= ? (as A 62 Y2), it follows that Ac \D = ?, i.e., D  A. We next show
that D is included not just in A, but also in all other events in X+nY1:
D  A0 for all A0 2 X+nY1: (4)
To show this, let A0 2 X+nY1, and note rst that A0c \Dc  A0c \Ac \Dc, which
(by the fact that D  A, i.e., Ac \ Dc = Ac) reduces to A0c \ Ac, which in turn
is non-empty since either Ac  A0c 6= ? or A0c  Ac 6= ?. So, A0c \ Dc 6= ?.
Since A0 and D are not logically independent (by assumption of Case 2), and since
A0 \D 6= ? (by Claim 2.2), A0 \Dc 6= ? (as A0 62 Y1) and A0c \Dc 6= ? (as just
shown), it follows that A0c \D = ?, so that D  A0. This proves (4).
Note that, for every event A0 in X+, either A
0  D (if A0 2 Y1) or D  A0 (if
A0 62 Y1, by (4)). So the augmented (sub)agenda X [ fD;Dcg is nested. This
is a contradiction as X is a maximal nested subagenda of X. Claim 2.3 is thus
established.
Claim 2.4. Y1; Y2 6= ?.
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By Claim 2.3 we may equivalently show that Y1; Y2 6= X+. Suppose for a
contradiction that Y1 = X+ or Y2 = X

+. Then X
 [ fD;Dcg is a nested agenda
which is larger than X (since D 62 X), a contradiction since X is a maximal
nested subagenda of X. This proves Claim 2.4.
The proof of condition (c) is completed by combining Claim 2.4 with the
following observation:
Claim 2.5. For all B 2 Y1 and C 2 Y2, the set Y := fBc; C;Dg satises the
requirements of condition (c), i.e., jY j = 3 and (Y nfAg) [ fAcg is consistent for
each A 2 Y .
Consider any B 2 Y1 and C 2 Y2 and let Y := fBc; C;Dg. To see why
jY j = 3, note that Bc 6= C since C 2 X+ while Bc 62 X+, and that D 6= Bc; C
since Bc; C 2 X while D 62 X. Further:
 fB;C;Dg is consistent by the follow argument. First, B  C as B and C
belong to the linearly ordered set X+ and as C 6 B by the fact that B 2 Y1
and C 62 Y1. So B \C \D = B \D. The latter set is indeed non-empty by
Claim 2.2.
 fBc; Cc; Dg is consistent by the following argument. First, since B  C (as
just shown), Cc  Bc. Also, Cc  D since C 2 Y2. So Bc \ Cc \D = Cc,
where this set is of course non-empty as ? 62 X.
 fBc; C;Dcg is consistent for the following reason. First, Dc  Bc since
B  D (as B 2 Y1). Second, Dc  C since Cc  D (as C 2 Y2). So,
Bc \ C \Dc = Dc, which is non-empty as ? 62 X. 
As mentioned in the main text, Theorem 4(a) is based on Lemmas 4 and 5.
To prove these, we rst show a simple lemma:
Lemma 15 If D : [0; 1]n ! [0; 1] is the local pooling criterion of a neutral pooling
function for an agenda X (6= f
;?g), then
(a) D(x) +D(1  x) = 1 for all x 2 [0; 1]n,
(b) D(0) = 0 and D(1) = 1, provided the pooling function is consensus preserv-
ing.
Proof of Lemma 15. (a) Note that, as X 6= f
;?g, X contains an event A 6=
?;
. For each x 2 [0; 1]n there are (by A 6= ?;
) opinion functions P1; :::; Pn 2
PX such that (P1(A); :::; Pn(A)) = x, and hence (P1(Ac); :::; Pn(Ac)) = 1   x,
which implies that
D(x) +D(1  x) = PP1;:::;Pn(A) + PP1;:::;Pn(Ac) = 1;
as desired.
(b) Since the pooling function is consensus-preserving, then D(1) = 1, whence
by part (a) D(0) = 1 D(1) = 0. 
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Proof of Lemma 4. Let D be the local pooling criterion of such a pooling
function for such an agenda X. Consider any x; y; z 2 [0; 1]n with sum 1. By
Proposition 4, there exist A;B;C 2 X such that each of the sets
A := Ac \B \ C, B := A \Bc \ C, C := A \B \ Cc
is non-empty. For all individuals i, since xi + yi + zi = 1 and since A; B; C
are pairwise disjoint non-empty members of (X), there exists a P i 2 P(X) such
that
P i (A
) = xi; P i (B
) = yi; P i (C
) = zi.
By construction,
P i (A
 [B [ C) = xi + yi + zi = 1 for all i: (5)
Now consider the restriction Pi := P i jX for each individual i. For the so-dened
prole (P1; :::; Pn) 2 PnX , we consider the collective opinion function PP1;:::;Pn. The
proof is completed by showing two claims.
Claim 1. P (A)+P (B)+P (C) = P (A[B[C) = 1 for some extension
P  2 P(X) of PP1;:::;Pn.
The rst equality holds for all extensions P  2 P(X) of P , by the pairwise
disjointness of the events A; B; C. Regarding the second equality, note that
each individual is opinion function Pi has an extension P i 2 P(X) for which
P i (A
 [ B [ C) = 1, so that by consensus compatibility PP1;:::;Pn also has such
an extension.
Claim 2. D(x) +D(y) +D(z) = 1.
Consider an extension P  2 P(X) of PP1;:::;Pn of the kind in Claim 1. As
P (A [B [ C) = 1, and as the intersection of Ac with A [B [ C is A,
P (Ac) = P (A): (6)
Since Ac 2 X, we further have
P (Ac) = PP1;:::;Pn(A
c) = D(P1(A
c); :::; Pn(A
c)),
where Pi(Ac) = P i (A
c) = xi for each individual i. So, P (Ac) = D(x). This
and (6) imply that P (A) = D(x). By similar arguments, P (B) = D(y) and
P (C) = D(z). So, Claim 2 follows from Claim 1. 
Proof of Lemma 5. Consider any D : [0; 1n]! [0; 1] such that D(0) = 0 and
D(x) +D(y) +D(z) = 1 for all x; y; z 2 [0; 1]n with x+ y + z = 1: (7)
We have D(1) = 1 (since D(1) +D(0) +D(0) = 1 where D(0) = 0) and
D(x) +D(1  x) = 1 for all x 2 [0; 1] (8)
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(since D(x) +D(1  x) +D(0) = 1 where D(0) = 0). Using (7) and then (8), for
all x; y 2 [0; 1]n with x+ y 2 [0; 1]n,
1 = D(x) +D(y) +D(1  x  y) = D(x) +D(y) + 1 D(x+ y).
So,
D(x+ y) = D(x) +D(y) for all x; y 2 [0; 1]n with x+ y 2 [0; 1]n: (9)
For any i 2 f1; :::; ng, consider the function Di : [0; 1]! [0; 1] dened by Di(t) =
D(0; :::; 0; t; 0; :::; 0), where t occurs at position i in (0; :::; 0; t; 0; :::; 0). By (9),
Di satises Di(s + t) = Di(s) + Di(t) for all s; t  0 with s + t  1. As one
can easily check, Di can be extended to a function Di : [0;1)! [0;1) such that
Di(s+t) = Di(s)+ Di(t) for all s; t  0, i.e., such that Di satises the non-negative
version of Cauchys functional equation. Hence there exists a wi  0 such that
Di(t) = wit for all t  0 by a well-known theorem (see Aczél 1966, Theorem 1).
Now for all x 2 [0; 1]n, we have D(x) =
Xn
i=1
Di(xi) (by repeated application of
(9)), and so (by Di(xi) = Di(xi) = wixi) D(x) =
Xn
i=1
wixi. Applying the latter
with x = 1 yields D(1) =
Xn
i=1
wi, hence
Xn
i=1
wi = 1. 
Proof of Theorem 4. (a) This part is proved by rst using Theorem 1(a) to
obtain neutrality, and then inferring linearity from Lemmas 4 and 5 (and from
Lemma 15(b), which of course applies as consensus compatibility implies consen-
sus preservation).
(b) Consider any agendaX 6= f?;
g which is nested or satises jXnf?;
gj 
4. If X is nested, the claim follows from Theorem 1(b), since non-neutrality im-
plies non-linearity. Now assumeX is non-nested and jXnf?;
gj  4. We may as-
sume without loss of generality that ?;
 62 X (since any independent, consensus-
compatible and non-neutral pooling function for agenda X 0 = Xnf?;
g imme-
diately extends to such a pooling function for agenda X). Since jXj  4, and
since jXj > 2 (as X is non-nested), we have jXj = 4, say X = fA;Ac; B;Bcg.
By non-nestedness, A and B are logically independent, i.e., the events A \ B;
A \ Bc; Ac \ B and Ac \ Bc are all non-empty. On PnX , consider the function
F : (P1; ::; Pn) 7! T  P1, where
T (p) :=
8<:
1 if p = 1
0 if p = 0
1
2
if p 2 (0; 1).
We complete the proof by establishing that (i) F maps into PX , i.e., is a proper
pooling function, (ii) F is consensus-compatible, (iii) F is independent, and (iv)
F is non-linear.
Claims (iii) and (iv) hold trivially.
Proof of (i): Let P1; :::; Pn 2 PX and let P := F (P1; :::; Pn) = T P1. We need
to extend P to a probability function on (X). For each atom C of (X) (i.e.,
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each C 2 fA \ B;A \ Bc; Ac \ B;Ac \ Bcg, let PC be the (unique) probability
function on (X) which assigns probability one to C. We distinguish between
three (exhaustive) cases.
Case 1 : P1(E) = 1 for two events E in X. Without loss of generality. assume
P1(A) = P1(B) = 1, and hence, P1(Ac) = P1(Bc) = 0. It follows that P (A) =
P (B) = 1 and P (Ac) = P (Bc) = 0, so that P extends (in fact, uniquely) to a
probability function on (X), namely the function PA\B.
Case 2 : P1(E) = 1 for exactly one event E in X. Without loss of generality,
assume P1(A) = 1 (hence, P1(Ac) = 0) and P1(B); P1(Bc) 2 (0; 1). It follows
that P (A) = 1, P (Ac) = 0 and P (B) = P (Bc) = 1
2
, so that P extends (again,
uniquely) to a probability function on (X), namely the function 1
2
PA\B+ 12PA\Bc .
Case 3 : P1(E) = 1 for no event E in X. Then P1(A); P1(Ac); P1(B); P1(Bc) 2
(0; 1), and so P (A) = P (Ac) = P (B) = P (Bc) = 1
2
. Hence, P extends (this
time non-uniquely) to a probability function on (X), for instance to the function
1
2
PA\B + 12PAc\Bc or the function
1
4
PA\B + 14PAc\B +
1
4
PA\Bc + 14PAc\Bc.
Proof of (ii): Let P1; :::; Pn 2 PX and consider any C 2 (X) such that each
Pi extends to some P i 2 P(X) such that P i (C) = 1. (What only matters for us
is that P1 has such an extension, given the denition of F .) We have to show that
P := F (P1; :::; Pn) = T  P1 is extendable to a P  2 P(X) such that P (C) = 1.
We verify the claim in each of the three cases considered in the proof of (i). In
Cases 1 and 2, the claim holds because the (unique) extension P  2 P(X) of
P has the same support as P 1 . (In fact, in Case 1 P
 = P 1 .) In Case 3, C
must intersect with each event in X (otherwise some event in X would have zero
probability under P1, in contradiction with Case 3) and include more than one of
the atoms A\B, A\Bc, Ac\B and Ac\Bc (again by Case 3). As one can easily
check, it follows that C  (A\B)[ (Ac \Bc) or C  (A\Bc)[ (Ac \B). So, to
ensure that the extension P  or P satises P (C) = 1, it su¢ ces to specify P  as
1
2
PA\B + 12PAc\Bc in the rst case, and as
1
2
PA\Bc + 12PAc\B in the second case. 
A.6 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof of Lemma 6. LetD be the local pooling criterion of a neutral and conditional-
consensus-compatible pooling function for a non-simple agenda X. Consider any
x; y; z 2 [0; 1]n with sum 1. As X is non-simple, there is a (countable) minimal
inconsistent set Y  X with jY j  3. So, there are pairwise distinct A;B;C 2 Y .
Dene
A :=
\
E2Y nfAg
E, B :=
\
E2Y nfBg
E, C :=
\
E2Y nfCg
E.
As (X) is closed under countable intersections, A; B; C 2 (X). For all i, as
xi + yi + zi = 1 and as A; B; C are (by Y s minimal inconsistency) pairwise
disjoint non-empty members of (X), there exists a P i 2 P(X) such that
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P i (A
) = xi; P i (B
) = yi; P i (C
) = zi.
By construction,
P i (A
 [B [ C) = xi + yi + zi = 1 for all i: (10)
Now consider the restriction Pi := P i jX for each individual i. For the so-dened
prole (P1; :::; Pn) 2 PnX , we consider the collective opinion function P := PP1;:::;Pn.
We now derive four properties of P (Claims 1-4), which then allow us to show
that D(x) +D(y) +D(z) = 1 (Claim 5), as desired.
Claim 1. P (\E2Y nfA;B;CgE) = 1 for all extensions P  2 P(X) of P .
For all E 2 Y nfA;B;Cg, we have E  A [ B [ C, so that by (10) we
have P1(E) = ::: = Pn(E) = 1, and hence P (E) = 1 by consensus preservation
(which follows from conditional consensus compatibility by Proposition 1(a)). So,
for any extension P  2 P(X) of P , we have P (E) = 1 for all E 2 Y nfA;B;Cg,
and thus P (\E2Y nfA;B;CgE) = 1, since the intersection of countably many events
of probability one has probability one.
Claim 2. P (Ac [Bc [ Cc) = 1 for all extensions P  2 P(X) of P .
Consider any extension P  2 P(X) of P . As A \ B \ C is disjoint from the
event \E2Y nfA;B;CgE, which by Claim 1 has P -probability one, P (A\B\C) = 0.
This implies Claim 2 because Ac [Bc [ Cc = (A \B \ C)c.
Claim 3. P ((Ac\B\C)[(A\Bc\C)[(A\B\Cc)) = 1 for some extension
P  2 P(X) of P .
As Ac \ Bc is disjoint with each of A; B; C, it is disjoint with the event
A [ B [ C which has P i -probability of one for each individual i by (10). So,
P i (A
c\Bc) = 0, i.e., P i (AcnB) = 0, for all i. For analogous reasons, P i (AcnC) =
0 and P i (B
cnC) = 0 for all i. Since, as just shown, each individual is opinion
function Pi has an extension P i which assigns zero probability to the events A
cnB,
AcnC and BcnC, by conditional consensus compatibility (and Proposition 3) the
collective opinion function P also has an extension P  2 P(X) assigning zero
probability to these three events, and hence, to their union (AcnB) [ (AcnC) [
(BcnC) = (Ac\Bc)[(Ac\Cc)[(Bc\Cc). In other words, there is a P -probability
of zero that at least two of Ac; Bc; Cc hold. Further, there is a P -probability of
one that at least one of Ac; Bc; Cc holds (by Claim 2). So, with P -probability of
one exactly one of Ac; Bc; Cc holds. This is precisely what had to be shown.
Claim 4. P (A)+P (B)+P (C) = P (A[B[C) = 1 for some extension
P  2 P(X) of P .
Consider an extension P  2 P(X) of P of the kind in Claim 3. The rst
equality follows from the pairwise disjointness of the events A; B; C. Regarding
the second equality, note that A [ B [ C is the intersection of the events
\E2Y nfA;B;CgE and (Ac \B \C)[ (A\Bc \C)[ (A\B \Cc), each of which has
P -probability of one by Claims 1 and 3. So P (A [B [ C) = 1, as claimed.
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Claim 5. D(x) +D(y) +D(z) = 1.
Consider an extension P  2 P(X) of P of the kind in Claim 4. As P (A [
B [ C) = 1 by Claim 4, and as the intersection of Ac with A [ B [ C is A,
we have
P (Ac) = P (A): (11)
Since Ac 2 X, we also have
P (Ac) = PP1;:::;Pn(A
c) = D(P1(A
c); :::; Pn(A
c)),
where Pi(Ac) = P i (A
c) = xi for each individual i. So, P (Ac) = D(x). This
and (11) imply that P (A) = D(x). By similar arguments, P (B) = D(y) and
P (C) = D(z). So, Claim 5 follows from Claim 4. 
Proof of Theorem 5. (a) This part is shown by rst deducing neutrality from
Theorem 2(a) (and the fact that non-simple agendas are non-nested), and then
inferring linearity from Lemmas 6 and 5 (and from Lemma 15(b), which applies
because conditional consensus compatibility implies consensus preservation).
(b) This part is reducible to the companion papers Theorem 5(b). Consider
a simple agenda, nite and not f?;
g. By the companion papers Theorem 5(b),
there is a pooling function F  for agenda  := (X) which, on X, is independent
and conditional-consensus-preserving but not neutral. By its independence on
X, it induces a pooling function for (sub)agenda X (see Lemma 13), which is
independent and conditional-consensus-compatible but not neutral (see Lemma
10). 
A.7 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof of Lemma 7. Let D be the local pooling criterion for such a pooling function
for a partitional agenda X. Consider any x; y; z 2 [0; 1]n with sum 1. Since
X is partitional, some countable Y  X partitions 
 into at least three (non-
empty) events. Choose distinct members A;B;C 2 Y . For all individuals i, since
xi + yi + zi = 1 and since A, B and C are pairwise disjoint and non-empty, there
exists a Pi 2 PX such that
Pi(A) = xi; Pi(B) = yi; Pi(C) = zi.
We write P for the collective opinion function under this prole. Since Y is
a countable partition of 
, and since P extends to a (-additive) probability
function, we have
P
E2Y P (E) = 1. Note that, for each E 2 Y nfA;B;Cg, we
have P (E) = 0, by consensus preservation (as Pi(E) = 0 for all i). So,
P (A) + P (B) + P (C) = 1.
45
So, since
P (A) = D(P1(A); :::; Pn(A)) = D(x);
P (A) = D(P1(B); :::; Pn(B)) = D(y);
P (A) = D(P1(C); :::; Pn(C)) = D(z);
we have D(x) +D(y) +D(z) = 1. 
Proof of Theorem 6. (a) This part follows by rst deducing neutrality from
Theorem 3(a), and then inferring linearity from Lemmas 7 and 5 (and Lemma
15(b)).
(b) This part follows immediately from Theorem 3(b) since non-neutrality
implies non-linearity. 
A.8 Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider an opinion pooling function for an agenda X.
We rst show part (b) and then part (a).
(b) We show this claim by proving that conditional consensus compatibility is
equivalent to the restriction of consensus compatibility to events A expressable as
([(C;D)2S(CnD))c for some nite set S of pairs (C;D) of events in X. This fact
follows from the equivalence of conditional consensus compatibility to implication
preservation (see Proposition 3) and the observation that, for any such set S,
an opinion function is consistent with zero probability of each event CnD (with
(C;D) 2 S) if and only if it is consistent with zero probability of the event
[(C;D)2S(CnD), i.e., with certainty of the event ([(C;D)2S(CnD))c.
(a) The claims made in this part about implicit consensus preservation and
consensus compatibility have already been shown (informally) in the main text.
It remains to show that conditional consensus compatibility implies consensus
preservation and is equivalent to it if X = (X). As just shown, conditional
consensus compatibility is equivalent to the restriction of consensus compatibility
to events A expressable as ([(C;D)2S(CnD))c for some nite set S  X  X.
Note that, for any A 2 X, we may let S take the form S = f(Ac; A)g, in which
case ([(C;D)2S(CnD))c = (AcnA)c = A. So, conditional consensus compatibility
implies consensus preservation and is equivalent to it if X = (X). 
Proof of Proposition 2. We assume that j
j  4. We can therefore consider a
partition of 
 into four non-empty events and deneX to be the agenda consisting
of any union of two of these four events. (Note that A 2 X , Ac 2 X, so that
X is indeed an agenda.) Nothing hinges on the size of the four events, so that
we may assume without loss of generality that each of them is singleton, i.e., that

 = f!1; !2; !3; !4g and X = fA  
 : jAj = 2g.
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Part 1. In this part of the proof, we show that X is path-connected and non-
partitional. Non-partitionality is trivial. To show path-connectedness, we consider
any events A;B 2 X and have to construct a path of conditional entailments from
A to B. This is done by distinguishing between three cases.
Case 1 : A = B. Then the path is trivial, since A ` A (take Y = ?).
Case 2 : A and B have exactly one world in common. We may then write A =
f!A; !g and B = f!B; !g with !A; !B; ! pairwise distinct. We have f!A; !g `
f!g (take Y = ff!; !0gg, where !0 is the element of 
nf!A; !B; !g) and f!g `
f!B; !g (take Y = ?).
Case 3 : A and B have no world in common. We may then write A =
f!A; !0Ag and B = f!B; !0Bg with !A; !0A; !B; !0B pairwise distinct. We have
f!A; !0Ag ` f!A; !Bg (take Y = ff!A; !0Bgg) and f!A; !Bg ` f!B; !0Bg (take
Y = ff!B; !0Agg).
Part 2. In this part, we construct a pooling function (P1; :::; Pn) 7! PP1;:::;Pn
that is independent (in fact, neutral) and consensus-preserving, but not linear.
As an ingredient to the construction, consider rst a linear pooling function L :
PnX ! PX (for instance the dictatorial one given by (P1; :::; Pn) 7! P1). We shall
transform L into a non-linear pooling function that is still neutral and consensus-
preserving. For this purpose, we use a xed transformation T : [0; 1]! [0; 1] such
that:
(i) T (1  x) = 1  T (x) for all x 2 [0; 1] (hence T (1=2) = 1=2),
(ii) T (0) = 0 (hence by (i) T (1) = 1),
(iii) T is strictly concave on [0; 1=2] (hence by (i) strictly convex on [1=2; 1]).
(Such a T indeed exists; e.g. T (x) = 4(x  1=2)3 + 1=2 for all x 2 [0; 1].)
For any P1; :::; Pn 2 PX , we dene the collective probability of any agenda
event A 2 X to be PP1;:::;Pn(A) := T (L(P1; :::; Pn)(A)). We now prove that, for
any P1; :::; Pn 2 PX , the just-dened function PP1;:::;Pn on X does indeed extend
to a probability function on (X) = 2
. This completes the proof, since it shows
that we have dened a proper pooling function, which is of course neutral (as L is
neutral), consensus-preserving (as L is consensus-preserving and T (1) = 1), and
non-linear (as L is linear and T a non-linear transformation).
Consider any probability function Q on 2
 (think of QjX as L(P1; :::; Pn) for
some given P1; :::; Pn 2 PX , and of Q as an extension to a probability function
on 2
). We show that the transformed function T QjX extends to a probability
function on 2
. To do so, it su¢ ces to show that there exist real numbers pk = p
Q
k ,
k = 1; 2; 3; 4, such that the function on 2
 assigning pk to each f!kg is a probability
function and extends T QjX , i.e., such that
(a) p1; p2; p3; p4  0 and p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 = 1,
(b) for all A 2 X, T (Q(A)) =
X
k:!k2A
pk.
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For any k 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g, we put qk := Q(f!kg); and for any k; l 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g
with k < l, we put qkl := Q(f!k; !lg). In order for the numbers p1; :::; p4 to satisfy
(b), they must satisfy the system
pk + pl = T (qkl) for all k; l 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g with k < l.
Given p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 = 1, three of these six equalities are redundant. Indeed,
consider k; l 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g, k < l, and dene k0; l0 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g, k0 < l0, by fk0; l0g =
f1; 2; 3; 4gnfk; lg. Since pk+pl = 1 pk0 pl0 and T (qkl) = T (1 qk0l0) = 1 T (qk0l0),
the equality pk + pl = T (qkl) is equivalent to pk0 + pl0 = T (qk
0l0). So (b) reduces
(given p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 = 1) to the system
p1 + p2 = T (q12), p1 + p3 = T (q13), p2 + p3 = T (q23).
We now solve this system of three linear equations in (p1; p2; p3) 2 R3. Write
tkl := T (qkl) for all k; l 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g, k < l. We rst bring the coe¢ cient matrix
of our three-equation system into triangular form:0@ 1 1 t121 1 t13
1 1 t23
1A !
0@ 1 1 t12 1 1 t13   t12
2 t23 + t13   t12
1A
!
0@ 1 1 t121 -1 t12   t13
1 t23+t13 t12
2
1A .
The system therefore has the following solution:
p3 =
t23 + t13   t12
2
(12)
p2 = t12   t13 + t23 + t13   t12
2
=
t12 + t23   t13
2
(13)
p1 = t12   t12 + t23   t13
2
=
t12 + t13   t23
2
Recalling that p4 = 1  (p1 + p2 + p3), we also have
p4 = 1  t12 + t13 + t23
2
: (14)
By their construction, the numbers p1; :::; p4 given by (12)-(14) satisfy condition
(b) and equation p1 + :::+ p4 = 1. To complete the proof of conditions (a)-(b), it
remains to show that p1; :::; p4  0. We do this by proving two claims.
Claim 1. p4  0, i.e., t12+t13+t232  1.
We have to prove that T (q12) + T (q13) + T (q23)  2. Note that
q12 + q13 + q23 = q
1 + q2 + q1 + q3 + q2 + q3 = 2(q1 + q2 + q3)  2.
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We distinguish three cases.
Case 1 : All of q12; q13; q23 are all at least 1=2. Then, by (i)-(iii), T (q12) +
T (q13) + T (q23)  q12 + q13 + q23  2, as desired.
Case 2 : At least two of q12; q13; q23 are below 1=2. Then, again using (i)-(iii),
T (q12) + T (q13) + T (q23) < 1=2 + 1=2 + 1 = 2, as desired.
Case 3 : Exactly one of q12; q13; q23 is below 1=2. Suppose q12 < 1=2  q13  q23
(otherwise just switch the roles of q12; q13; q23). For all   0 such that q13 ; q23+
 2 [1=2; 1], the convexity of T on [1=2; 1] implies that
T (q13)  1
2
[T (q13   ) + T (q23 + )]
and T (q23)  1
2
[T (q13   ) + T (q23 + )] ,
so that (by adding these two inequalities)
T (q13) + T (q23)  T (q13   ) + T (q23 + ).
This inequality may be applied to  = 1  q23, since
q13   (1  q23) = (q13 + q23 + q12)  q12   1  2  q12   1 = 1  q12 2 [1=2; 1];
which implies that
T (q13) + T (q23)  T (q13   (1 + q23)) + T (1):
On the right hand side of this inequality, we have T (1) = 1 and, by q13 (1+q23) 
1  q12 and Ts increasingness, T (q13   (1 + q23))  T (1  q12) = 1  T (q12). So,
we obtain T (q13) + T (q23)  1 + 1  T (q12), i.e., T (q12) + T (q13) + T (q23)  2, as
desired.
Claim 2. pk  0 for all k = 1; 2; 3.
We only show that p1  0, as the proofs for p2 and p3 are analogous. We have
to prove that t13+ t23  t12  0, i.e., that T (q13)+T (q23)  T (q12), or equivalently,
that T (q1+q3)+T (q2+q3)  T (q1+q2). As T is an increasing function, it su¢ ces
to establish T (q1) + T (q2)  T (q1 + q2). Again, we consider three cases.
Case 1 : q1 + q2  1=2. Suppose q1  q2 (otherwise the roles of q1 and q2 get
swapped). For all   0 such that q1   ; q2 +  2 [0; 1=2], the concavity of T on
[0; 1=2] implies that
T (q1)  1
2

T (q1   ) + T (q2 + )
and T (q2)  1
2

T (q1   ) + T (q2 + ) ,
so that (by adding these inequalities)
T (q1) + T (q2)  T (q1   ) + T (q2 + ).
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Applying this to the case  = q1 yields T (q1) + T (q2)  T (0) + T (q2 + q1) =
T (q1 + q2), as desired.
Case 2 : q1 + q2 > 1=2 but q1; q2  1=2. By (i)-(iii),
T (q1) + T (q2)  q1 + q2  T (q1 + q2),
as desired.
Case 3 : q1 > 1=2 or q2 > 1=2. Suppose q2 > 1=2 (otherwise swap q1 and q2
in the proof). Then q1 < 1=2, as otherwise q1 + q2 > 1. Dene y := 1   q1   q2.
Since we also have y < 1=2, an argument analogous to that in case 1 yields
T (q1) + T (y)  T (q1 + y), i.e., T (q1) + T (1   q1   q2)  T (1   q2). So, by (i),
T (q1) + 1  T (q1 + q2)  1  T (q2), i.e., T (q1) + T (q2)  T (q1 + q2). 
One might wonder why the pooling function constructed in this proof violates
conditional consensus compatibility which it must do since Theorem 5 tells us
that independent conditional-consensus-compatible pooling functions must be lin-
ear (for non-simple, hence in particular for path-connected agendas). Let 
 andX
be as in the proof, and consider a prole with complete unanimity: all individuals
i give !1 probability 0, each of !2; !3 probability 1/4, and hence !4 probability
1/2. As f!1g is the di¤erence of two events in X (e.g. f!1; !2gnf!2; !3g), impli-
cation preservation (which is equivalent to conditional consensus compatibility)
would require the collective probability of !1 to be 0 as well. But the collective
probability of !1 is (in the notation of the proof) given by
p1 =
t12 + t13   t23
2
=
T (q12) + T (q13)  T (q23)
2
,
where qkl is the collective probability of f!k; !lg under a linear pooling function,
so that qkl equals the unanimous individual probability of f!k; !lg. So,
p1 =
T (1=4) + T (1=4)  T (1=2)
2
= T (1=4)  T (1=2)
2
,
which is strictly positive as T is strictly concave on [0; 1=2] with T (0) = 0.
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